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interest, and insider trading—as well as possible solutions that would allow the
markets to continue to evolve while promoting their integrity and investor protection goals. Specifically, the Article proposes establishing a minimum information
requirement for secondary trading in private company stock and reexamining the
thresholds for accredited investor status in order to ensure that market participants
can fend for themselves without additional protections. The Article also examines
potential responses to insider trading in these markets, arguing that a case exists for
the SEC to take action in the private market context, since harm may be cognizable
and the arguments for regulating insider trading are as strong in the private market
arena as in the public.
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INTRODUCTION
A new generation of securities markets is emerging. Shares in private
companies, previously regarded as an illiquid, out-of-reach asset class, are
being traded on websites resembling stock markets. Hot demand for private
shares of Facebook and other technology and social media companies has
fueled the recent meteoric rise of these online markets. Their future may
turn, however, on how policymakers and market participants deal with
information issues in these markets, which to date have been largely
unregulated. This Article is the first to examine these information issues
and potential responses to them.
The new online marketplaces for trading private company stock have
arisen in the context of changing market patterns. Over the past decade, the
number of start-up companies entering the capital markets through an
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initial public offering (IPO) has significantly dropped relative to historical
norms.1 Whereas from 1991 to 2000, nearly 2000 venture-backed companies
went public, fewer than 500 did so from 2001 to 2010.2 In addition, the
median age of companies at the time of their IPOs has increased.3 Partially
in response to the decline in IPOs, Congress recently enacted the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).4 Among other things, the JOBS
Act created an “on-ramp” that reduces burdens on newly public companies,
but these regulatory changes are recent and their effects remain to be seen.5
With fewer companies going public, and with those that do staying private longer than before, early start-up employees and venture capital firms
(VCs) have experienced significantly longer waiting periods before gaining
liquidity in private company stock. VCs are “institutional managers of risk
capital” that support the growth of innovative companies.6 When a VC
invests in a start-up company, the investment is essentially illiquid and of
uncertain value until the company matures and reaches a liquidity event.7
The liquidity event, typically achieved by the company’s acquisition or
through an IPO, marks the payoff for the VC and its fund investors.8
Likewise, employees and former employees in start-up companies have
depended on the company reaching a liquidity event in order to cash in on
stock earned as equity compensation.9
Meanwhile, during this period of decline in the IPO market and increasing liquidity concerns, outside interest in buying private company stock has
surged.10 Certain high-profile private companies have grown quickly and

1 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2012 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N Y.B. 52
fig.5.03 [hereinafter NVCA Y.B.], available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=257&Itemid=103 (tracking the number of IPOs each year from
1985–2011).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
5 It is currently unclear whether the Act will incentivize IPOs. Although it created an “onramp” that eases disclosure, auditing, and other regulatory requirements for a new category known
as “emerging growth” companies, id. §§ 101–108, it also raised the number of record holders that a
private company may have before being forced to publicly report, id. §§ 501–502. For further
discussion of the JOBS Act, see infra subsection I.A.2 and Part V.
6 NVCA Y.B., supra note 1, at 7.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2012)
(explaining that employees holding common shares in a start-up cannot redeem their shares at will).
10 See, e.g., Jay Yarow, Are We Headed for Disaster with Private Stock Markets? We Talk to
SharesPost CEO David Weir, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
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have offered the allure of potentially huge rewards when the company
finally has an IPO.
These factors have set the stage for a liquidity revolution in private
company stock, ignited by new online platforms such as SecondMarket and
SharesPost. These platforms act as intermediaries to facilitate private company stock trading, creating centralized meeting places for potential buyers
and sellers and lowering transaction costs.11 Estimates of the size of this
secondary market measure the total transaction volume in the billions.12
The rapid growth of these markets suggests a potential solution to the
liquidity issues in private company stock.13
But these new secondary markets also pose significant information issues
that have not yet been explored in the legal literature.14 As this Article
explains, these issues include a lack of information about the private
companies whose stock is being traded, information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers, and undisclosed conflicts of interest among market
participants. These information issues raise concerns about the accuracy of
the stocks’ valuations and whether secondary investors in these markets can
truly fend for themselves without additional securities laws protections.
Further, concerns about insider trading hang over the community, as many
of the selling shareholders are employees or former employees, and much of
the material information about the companies is nonpublic.
This Article makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it
identifies and analyzes the information issues in the new online secondary
markets. Such issues constitute some of the most critical concerns about
these markets today. Second, the Article explores potential responses to
these information issues. Specifically, the Article proposes establishing a
minimum information requirement for trading in private company stock
com/sharespost-interview-2011-3 (“Interest in the private markets for trading stock in hot startups
is at an all time high.”).
11 See infra Section I.B.
12 See, e.g., Richard Teitelbaum, Facebook Drives SecondMarket Broking $1 Billion Private
Shares, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-27/facebook-drivessecondmarket-broking-1-billion-private-shares.html (“The value of all private-share transactions was
$4.6 billion in 2010, up from $2.4 billion in 2009 . . . .”).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 4 (describing the secondary markets and arguing that
they help to solve investor lock-in problems in the venture capital model); Jose Miguel Mendoza
& Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The “New” Venture Capital Cycle (Part I): The Importance of Private
Secondary Market Liquidity 14-15 (Lex Research Topics in Corp. Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1829835 (arguing that liquidity gaps disrupt
the venture capital cycle and that secondary marketplaces for private company stock help bridge
these gaps).
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and reexamining accredited investor thresholds to ensure that market
participants can fend for themselves without additional protections. The
Article also examines potential responses to insider trading in these
markets, arguing that a case for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) taking action exists, as harm may be cognizable and the arguments
for regulating insider trading are as strong in the private market realm as in
the public. Finally, the Article situates these contributions in a broader
context by examining the underlying tension between these private secondary markets and public markets.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the venture capital cycle and the IPO market, as well as the securities law framework in which the secondary marketplaces have grown. In addition, it
details the rise of the secondary markets and their mechanics. Against that
background, Part II discusses the potential benefits these markets offer. Part
III analyzes the information issues in the secondary markets, including lack
of information, asymmetric information, conflicts of interest, and insider
trading. Part IV explores potential responses to these issues, with the aim of
sparking a wider conversation. Finally, Part V deepens and contextualizes
the analysis and potential responses to it by engaging with policy concerns
about the public–private divide.
I. SECONDARY MARKETS FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK
A. Background
The secondary markets for private company stock have developed in the
context of a changing venture capital and liquidity environment, and in a
regulatory framework that was largely established long before regulators
could have imagined the existence of online marketplaces. This Section
briefly describes the venture capital cycle and the IPO market, as well as the
securities law context in which the secondary marketplaces have grown.
This background helps explain the business opportunity that the secondary
marketplaces have seized and lays the groundwork for understanding the
information issues in these markets that this Article explores.
1. Venture Capital Cycle and Liquidity Environment
The venture capital life cycle starts with the creation of funds that raise
capital from institutional and private investors interested in start-up
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companies.15 A venture capital fund is typically organized as a limited
partnership with the VC as the general partner and the investors as the
limited partners.16 The VC selects the portfolio companies for the fund, and
nurtures and supports them by contributing money and often services or
advice that the companies need in order to develop.17
Venture capital funds generally have a defined period of existence, or
“term,” and detailed rules about how investors in these funds can liquidate
their assets in the funds at the end of that period.18 The goal is for the startup companies to achieve successful “exits” that make a significant return on
investment for the venture capital fund. Indeed, venture capital fund
liquidity depends on start-ups’ exits.19 The primary exit mechanisms for
start-ups are going public and being acquired in a merger transaction
(sometimes referred to as an “M&A exit”).20 While M&A exits are more
common, industry insiders have long viewed IPOs as essential for sustaining a robust venture capital industry because of their potential for high
investor returns.21
In the past decade, there have been significant declines in the number of
companies listing on major U.S. stock exchanges and in the number of
IPOs. These drops have posed substantial challenges for the venture capital

15 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003). For an overview of the venture capital industry, see PAUL
GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 1-32 (2d ed. 2004).
16 Gilson, supra note 15, at 1071.
17 Id.
18 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock
Market?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1999, at 36, 41 (discussing the standard limited partnership
agreement and its effect on investors).
19 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that venture capital “exhibit[s] investor lock-in”).
20 D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 317 (2005).
21 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 11 (“IPOs are the gold standard in VC success.”); ERNST &
YOUNG, GLOBALIZING VENTURE CAPITAL 17, available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/Globalizing_venture_capital_Gloal_venture_capital_insights_and_trends_report_2011/
$FILE/Globalizing_venture_capital_Global_venture_capital_insights_and_trends_report_2011.pdf
(“M&A makes up close to 90% of US VC-backed exits in the United States.”); Richard Smith et
al., The Relative Importance of IPO and M&A Exits for Venture Capital Fund Financial
Performance 3 & n.3 (Feb. 28, 2011) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://sites.
kauffman.org/efic/resources/Venture-Capital-Fund-Financial-Performance.pdf (examining the view
that “fund success is predominantly due to IPO exits” and noting that “IPO exit valuations tend to
be materially higher than M&A exit valuations”). But see DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT
THORNTON, MARKET STRUCTURE IS CAUSING THE IPO CRISIS—AND MORE 7 (2010),
available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/
Files/IPO%20crisis%20-%20June%202010%20-%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he exit workhorse of venture
capital is now the sale of a portfolio company to mostly strategic (large corporate) acquirers.”).
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cycle.22 The number of companies listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges
reached its highest point at over 7000 in 1997 and has been declining since.23
Currently, about 4000 companies are listed on major U.S. stock exchanges,
and experts believe that the number may decrease further.24
Part of this loss stems from a precipitous drop in the number of IPOs
since the crash of the Internet bubble in 2000.25 In addition, changes in the
public markets, such as the decimalization of stock quotes and the costs of
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, may have raised the costs
associated with being public and affected possible exit strategies for private
firms.26 In particular, the demographics of small firm IPOs have shifted
significantly—whereas IPOs raising less than $50 million once constituted
more than 80% of IPOs, that number has fallen to just 20%.27 Further, the
median age of companies at their time of IPO has increased in the past
decade, to nearly ten years.28 The average time for venture-backed companies to reach an M&A exit has also lengthened, from 1.8 years in 2000 to 5.4

22 See, e.g., NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE CAPITAL 101: WHAT IS VENTURE
CAPITAL? 9-10 (2008), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&
task=doc_download&gid=357 (“[U]nless a company is acquired or goes public, there is little actual
value.”).
23 Felix Salmon, Op-Ed., Wall Street’s Dead End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A27.
24 Id.
25 See NVCA Y.B., supra note 1, at 52 fig.5.03 (providing historical data on the number of
venture-backed IPOs per year and showing that the number of IPOs in 2001 and later was a
fraction of the number of IPOs through the 1990s); see also Graham Bowley, Fleeing to Foreign
Shores, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2011, at B1 (noting that there were only 119 IPOs in the United States
in 2010, compared with 756 in 1996, and discussing several reasons why some companies are going
public abroad rather than in the United States).
26 See Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United States, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 370 (2006) (noting that Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley has
raised the costs associated with IPOs); see also WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing how
decimalization constrained the trading of smaller companies’ stock); Francesco Bova et al., The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of Private Firms 28 (May 5, 2011) (unnumbered working
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract_id=1730242 (finding that Sarbanes-Oxley appears to
have “shifted the distribution landscape from IPO to acquisitions”).
27 GRANT THORNTON, HOPE FOR THE SMALL IPO MARKET? 1 (2011), available at http://
www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Technology/Techdashboard/Grant%20Thornton%20%20Hope%20for%20the%20small%20IPO%20market%20FINAL.pdf.
28 NVCA Y.B., supra note 1, at 52 fig.5.03; see also IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO
ON-RAMP 6 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_
on-ramp.pdf (“The average age at IPO of companies going public between 1997 and 2001 was
approximately five and a half years, compared with more than nine years for companies going
public between 2006 and 2011.”).
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years in 2010.29 Thus, in recent years, venture-backed private companies
have taken longer to reach exit, and their exits are less often via IPO.
The demand for liquidity in start-up company stock builds with this
longer wait time. Most venture capital funds have terms of ten years or
less,30 and VCs that hold private company stock may need to provide
limited partners (the investors in a venture capital fund) with liquidity at
the end of a fund’s life cycle. In addition, long-term (as well as former)
employees in a start-up may have a lot of “paper wealth” from the value of
their vested stock options, but not much cash to upgrade their lifestyles or
diversify their investments.31 Furthermore, companies may have difficulty
attracting talented employees in the first place if incentive stock options are
not viewed as valuable.32
The longer exit horizon for shareholders in private start-up companies
has created what some scholars have identified as a “liquidity gap” in the
venture capital cycle.33 Liquidity gaps are significant because of their
potential for discouraging venture capital investment and entrepreneurship—that is, the availability of a timely exit strategy can affect whether
prospective investors will commit in the first place to contributing human
and capital resources to a start-up.34
29 Joseph Ghalbouni & Dominique Rouziès, The VC Shakeout, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug.
2010, at 21, 22.
30 DAN BURSTEIN & SAM SCHWERIN, MILLENNIUM TECH. VALUE PARTNERS, L.P.,
INSIDE THE GROWING SECONDARY MARKET FOR VENTURE CAPITAL ASSETS 6 (2008),
available at http://mtvlp.com/files/resources/InsidetheGrowingSecondary.pdf; KEN SAWYER ET
AL., SAINTS CAPITAL, A GUIDE TO SECONDARY TRANSACTIONS: ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO
LIQUIDITY IN PRIVATE COMPANIES 6 (2010), available at http://www.saintscapital.com (click
“Download Secondary Transaction Guide”).
31 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50
B.C. L. REV. 639, 642 (2009) (“Company founders value share liquidity because it allows them to
easily diversify their portfolios.”).
32 See Sean F. Reid et. al., The Valuation of Employee Stock Options Issued by Closely Held Firms,
13 J. LEGAL ECON. 19, 23 (2006) (“Startup firms often lack adequate cash flow to pay competitive
salaries for talented employees and executives. To lure these desirable employees and executives to
the startup firm, as well as retain their services as the company matures, a lucrative ESO
[employee stock option] package may be the most critical component of the compensation . . . .”).
33 Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 14, at 3, 10. In this context, the term “liquidity gap”
refers to the period of time before a company has an exit event and investors have liquidity in
their investment. This period of time is much longer than it was in the 1990s. See supra text
accompanying notes 28-29.
34 See Industry Statistics Update: Is the Venture Capital Industry Experiencing a Capital Crisis?,
NVCA TODAY (Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n), Sept. 7, 2008, available at http://nvcatoday.nvca.
org/index.php/industry-statistics-update-is-the-venture-capital-industry-experiencing-a-capitalcrisis.html (positing that a decrease in the number of IPOs in 2008 had led to a drop in venture
capital funding); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 15, at 345 (“The need to ultimately exit
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2. Securities Law Framework
Another important foundation for understanding the rise of the private
secondary markets is the existing securities law framework. Federal securities laws govern investment in private start-up companies and any subsequent sales of stock by the investor or other shareholders. In brief, when a
company sells its stock, it must either register the stock with the SEC as a
public offering or structure the offering as a private placement fitting within
a specified securities law exemption.35 If the company goes the latter route,
a registration exemption must again apply when any resale of that stock
occurs.36 This resale, from an existing investor to a third party, is known as
a “secondary transaction.”37 This Section briefly covers the relevant securities laws as they lay the groundwork for how the private secondary
markets operate.
a. Registration and Private Placements
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) “to provide
investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and,
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing.”38 The Securities Act provides that,
unless otherwise exempt, all offers and sales of securities must be registered
with the SEC.39 Registration under the Securities Act is costly. Issuers
must file a registration with extensive disclosures and pay fees to the SEC
as well as legal and accounting fees and expenses, stock exchange listing
fees, and any underwriting compensation incurred.40 In addition to these
investments shapes every aspect of the venture capital cycle, from the ability to raise capital to the
types of investments that are made.”); WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 7 (“[T]he lack of an IPO
market has caused venture capitalists to avoid financing some of the more far-reaching and risky
ideas that have no obvious Fortune 500 buyer.”).
35 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATIONS: THE ESSENTIALS
297-98 (2008).
36 Id. at 319.
37 Id. at 13.
38 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at
1-5 (1933)).
39 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006). “Offer” and “sale” are interpreted broadly to include “every
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security . . . .” Id. § 77b(a)(3); see
also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 907 (2011) (noting the broad sweep of Section 5 of
the Securities Act).
40 Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 908.
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registration expenses, the ongoing costs of being a public reporting company
are high and include costs associated with ongoing reporting under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), regulatory compliance,
and being in the public eye.41
If a private company wishes to avoid registration, it must structure sales
of its securities to fit within the safe harbor of an exemption. Exemptions
are based on the general notion that registration safeguards are unnecessary
for the adequate protection of investors and markets for certain limited
offerings.42
The primary statutory exemption for private placements is Section 4(2)
of the Securities Act, which exempts “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”43 The statute does not explicitly define “public
offering.”44 In the seminal case on the topic, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the
Supreme Court clarified that the applicability of the exemption “should
turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection
of the [Securities] Act,” which is designed “to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment

41 Id. at 910 n.147; see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 156 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing some of the indirect costs of an IPO). For “emerging
growth companies” with less than $1 billion in total annual gross revenues, the JOBS Act reduced
regulatory burdens associated with going public by creating a transitional on-ramp that phases in
certain compliance measures over a period of time after the company’s IPO. JOBS Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-106, §§ 101–108, 126 Stat. 306, 307-13 (2012). Such measures include lowered requirements
for audited financial statements at the time of IPO, limited executive compensation disclosure,
phase-in periods for certain financial accounting standards, and exemptions from auditor
attestations under Sarbanes-Oxley and “say-on-pay” votes. Id. §§ 102–104. The JOBS Act’s effect
on the U.S. IPO market remains to be seen. See, e.g., Liz Gannes, How Will the JOBS Act Affect
Tech IPOs?, ALLTHINGSD (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:39 AM PT), http://allthingsd.com/20120405/how-willthe-jobs-act-affect-tech-ipos (“[T]he consensus from everyone I talked to is that the JOBS Act is
more of a reducer of friction than a significant change to the incentives around going public.”). But
see PHILLIP J. KARDIS II ET AL., K&L GATES, CAPITAL MARKETS RELIEF: JOBS ( JUMPSTART
OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS) ACT EASES REGULATORY BARRIERS TO IPOS AND OTHER
CAPITAL RAISING ALTERNATIVES 3 (2012), available at http://www.klgates.com/capital-marketsrelief-jobs-jumpstart-our-business-startups-act-eases-regulatory-barriers-to-ipos-and-other-capitalraising-alternatives-04-05-2012 (expecting, as a result of the JOBS Act, “an increase in the number
of small IPOs compared to the diminished levels of recent years”).
42 Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 928; see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (noting
the inefficiency of requiring registration “where there is no practical need for [application of the
Securities Act] or where the public benefits are too remote”); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133 (“As a historical matter,
Congress did not design the securities laws to protect investors capable of protecting themselves.”).
43 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). This Article refers to the securities laws in the customary manner to
date, with pre–JOBS Act numbering.
44 Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 912.
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decisions.”45 The Court thus reasoned that “[a]n offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction not involving any
public offering.”46
Two factors help determine the ability to fend for oneself: (1) the offeree’s
knowledge or sophistication in investment matters and (2) his access to
information.47 In sum, sophisticated offerees with access to information
similar to that provided in a registration statement would not need the
protections of the Securities Act, and a transaction constituted of such
offerees would not be a public offering.48
Since Ralston Purina, the SEC has promulgated Regulation D49 to provide additional clarity in this area and to mitigate the uncertainty inherent
in Section 4(2)’s private placement exemption.50 Regulation D includes
Rule 506, which provides a safe harbor for offerings limited to “accredited
investors.”51 Rule 501 defines “accredited investors” as specified institutional
investors such as banks, and individuals with a net worth over $1 million or
annual income over $200,000 (or $300,000 joint annual income) for the
previous two years.52 Accredited status is thus a proxy for being able to fend
for oneself, objectively determined by institutional identity, or the net
worth or income of the individual investor.
b. Exemptions for Resales
Privately placed securities are not freely tradable, and any “secondary
transaction” in which an existing shareholder sells to a third party must

45
46
47

346 U.S. 119, 124, 125 (1953).
Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 125-27 (analyzing the investor’s access to information); Heminway & Hoffman,
supra note 39, at 914 & n.173 (noting that courts have interpreted “sophistication” as the “financial
and business knowledge that allows them to appreciate the risks of the investment”).
48 Cf. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125-27.
49 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–508 (2012).
50 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 915 (highlighting the clarifying purpose of
Regulation D).
51 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Rule 506 allows the issuer to include up to thirty-five unaccredited investors as well, provided the issuer reasonably believes they are sophisticated—meaning
the investor “has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,” either alone or with the
assistance of a purchaser representative. Id.
52 Id. § 230.501(a)(1)–(6). Congress recently amended the net worth requirement to exclude
the value of the investor’s primary residence. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010); see also Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793 (Dec. 29, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R.).
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likewise be structured to fit within an available exemption from registration.53
One of the most commonly relied-upon exemptions for secondary transactions of private company stock is Rule 144, a safe harbor under Section 4(1)
of the Securities Act, which exempts transactions “by any person other than
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.”54 Rule 144 allows for the sale of restricted
securities provided the seller has held them for a certain period of time—at
least one year for nonreporting company stock.55 Rule 144A exempts resales
of securities with no required holding period if the buyer is a “qualified
institutional buyer” (QIB), which is an institution that in the aggregate
owns and invests at least $100 million in securities of nonaffiliated entities.56
Information requirements apply under Rule 144A as well as under Rule 144
when the seller is an affiliate of the company whose stock is being sold.57
Nonaffiliate sellers of private company stock are subject to a holding period,
but are not subject to the information requirement under Rule 144.58
Finally, the so-called “Section 4(1½)” exemption may exempt the resale of
restricted securities in a transaction structured similarly to a private

53 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity
Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409, 418-20 (2008) (discussing the securities law framework for resale
of privately placed securities).
54 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2006). If a seller meets the requirements of Rule 144, he or she will not
be deemed an “underwriter” in connection with the resale of the restricted securities. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (preliminary note).
55 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii).
56 Id. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i).
57 See id. §§ 230.144(b)(2) & 230.144(c)(2) (requiring disclosure of information about a private company issuer upon request, including a brief description of the company’s business,
products, and services, as well as certain financial statements, as required in 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c211(a)(5)); id. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (requiring an issuer that is not an Exchange Act reporting
company, a foreign issuer exempt from reporting, or a foreign government, to provide certain
information upon request, including a brief description of the company’s business, products, and
services, as well as financial information for its two preceding fiscal years). Rule 144 defines
“affiliate” as any “person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls,
or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.” Id. § 230.144(a)(1). Rule 144
does not define “control,” but Rule 405 of Regulation C establishes an identical definition of
“affiliate” and defines “control” as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Id. § 230.405. An individual’s status as an affiliate is a
fact-specific inquiry, determined by considering relevant facts in accordance with Rule 405. An
individual’s status as a director, officer, or 10% shareholder is relevant, but is only “one fact which
must be taken into consideration.” American-Standard, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 19628
(Oct. 11, 1972).
58 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(1)(ii); Revisions to Rules 144 and 145: A Small Entity Compliance
Guide, SEC, (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rules144-145-secg.htm.
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placement.59 Section 4(1½) extends the logic of Sections 4(1) and 4(2) to
resales by non-issuers—that is, it exempts someone other than an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer who sells to purchasers able to “fend for themselves”
within the meaning of Ralston Purina.60 Although not expressly in the
Securities Act or formally adopted by the SEC, Section 4(1½) has been
recognized by the SEC in interpretive releases.61
Considering the legal restrictions in total, “[t]he net effect . . . is that the
restricted stock is less liquid or more costly to resell than freely tradable
stock.”62 Buyers and sellers incur search and bargaining costs to identify
potential transaction partners, as well as compliance and trade delay costs
created by the exemption requirements.63
c. The Record Holder Rule
Finally, start-up companies may be concerned about resale of their stock
because such sales can increase the number of shareholders on the company’s
record. If a shareholder sells a partial stake, that one shareholder might
become two or more. Thus, private companies may be concerned about
eventually triggering registration requirements under Section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act.64 Until April 2012, Section 12(g) provided that any company
with total assets exceeding $10 million and a class of equity security “held of

59 See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 11:12 (2011); Carl W. Schneider, Section 4(1½)—Private Resales of Restricted or Control
Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 504 (1988) (tracking the statutory origins of the exemption).
Section 4(1½)’s name comes from the idea that it combines Section 4(1)’s exemption for
“‘transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer’” with Section 4(2)’s
exemption for “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” Robert A. Prentice &
Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine: New Relief from Securities Regulation or a
New Haven for Welshers?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 510 n.244 (1983).
60 See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW 85 (3d ed. 2006) (“[T]he exemption
is somewhere between Section 4(1) . . . and Section 4(2) . . . .”); see also supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, 19 SEC Docket 465,
496 n.178 (Feb. 19, 1980) (explaining that the Section 4(1½) “hybrid exemption” is “clearly within
[the] intended purpose” of the Securities Act); see also Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1335
n.6 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the Section 4(1½) exemption as legitimate).
62 Sjostrom, supra note 53, at 420.
63 Id. at 422.
64 For these registration requirements, see 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006), amended by JOBS Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 501–502 & 601, 126 Stat. 306, 325, 326 (2012). In addition to crossing the
Section 12(g) threshold, a company also becomes subject to the Exchange Act by listing securities
on a national securities exchange or by making a registered public offering under the Securities
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a) & 78o(d).
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record by five hundred or more . . . persons” must register such security
under the Exchange Act.65
This rule has had the practical effect of forcing some companies to become public reporting companies earlier than they would otherwise choose.
The classic example is Google, which reached the threshold in 2003 and
went public in early 2004, stating, “by law, certain private companies must
report as if they were public companies. The deadline imposed by this
requirement accelerated our decision [to go public].”66 More recently,
Facebook found itself in a similar position.67
Congress added Section 12(g) to the Exchange Act in 1964 to protect
investors by mandating disclosures from companies with “sufficiently active
trading markets and public interest.”68 It was aimed at private trading that
had grown in the over-the-counter market.69 Congress used company assets
and the number of shareholders as a proxy, or guideline, for determining
which companies should be required to publicly report.70
While Congress has amended Section 12(g) over the years to raise the
asset threshold,71 the original 500-record-holders threshold remained
unchanged until the JOBS Act increased it to 2000, provided that no more
than 499 of those holders are unaccredited investors.72 Further, the JOBS
Act excludes from the increased limit those holders who obtained equity
under the company’s equity compensation plans.73 The higher threshold
65 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g). The measurement date for the threshold is the last day of the company’s
fiscal year. Id. If it exceeds the threshold, the company has 120 days to register. Id.
66 Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at iv (Apr. 29, 2004).
67 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/?p=1028 (noting that Facebook planned to
surpass 499 owners in 2012, the year it went public).
68 Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 23,407, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,369 ( J uly
14, 1986).
69 S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 1 (1963); Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook and the 500-Person Threshold, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 3, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/
03/facebook-and-the-500-person-threshold; see also H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 1 (1964) (reporting
that Section 12(g) was intended to “extend to investors in certain over-the-counter securities the
same protection now afforded to those in listed securities”).
70 See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at
18-21) (on file with author) (detailing the history of Section 12(g)).
71 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006). The total assets threshold was originally $1 million in 1964,
increased to $5 million in the 1980s, and increased to $10 million in 1996. Relief from Reporting by
Small Issues, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37157, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,354 (May 9, 1996).
72 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012). The Act refers to accredited
status as a term defined by the SEC. Id.
73 Id. § 502.
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may give private companies more control over the timing of an IPO and
may make them less sensitive to the effect of stock options and stock resales
on the number of company record holders.74
With this background on the venture capital cycle, the liquidity environment in private company stock, and the relevant securities law framework, the next Section turns to the private secondary markets.
B. The Rise of the Secondary Markets and How They Work
The combination of the lengthened period of time companies stay private, securities law exemptions for the resale of restricted stock, and
information technology has created a unique business opportunity. And
new marketplaces for trading private shares have emerged to seize it. The
two largest of these markets are SecondMarket and SharesPost.75
These online markets, themselves private companies, are modernizing
the secondary transaction process. While securities law exemptions allowing
trades in private company stock have existed for a long time, SharesPost
and SecondMarket have innovated by establishing online marketplaces for
this trading, acting as intermediaries to facilitate trades between potential
buyers and sellers. They have user-friendly websites that have been fueled
by demand for pre-IPO stock in highly visible venture capital–backed
companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Groupon, LinkedIn, and Zynga.76
And the online platforms were designed with securities laws in mind77—
74 Cf. The JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act)—What Does It Mean for Entrepreneurs?,
COOLEY LLP (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.cooley.com/jobs-act-what-does-it-mean (“Because
companies will be able to stay private longer, it is possible that we will see a larger, more robust
market for secondary sales of shares of private companies. However, we expect many entrepreneurs and investors to continue to explore increasingly restrictive policies with respect to
secondary sales of their companies’ securities, particularly on secondary exchanges.”).
75 A handful of precursors and alternatives to SecondMarket and SharesPost exist. See generally WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 17 (listing various precursors such as the PORTAL Alliance
and NYPPEX); see also Ben Popper, Gate Technologies Expands, Challenges SecondMarket’s Model,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://www.observer.com/2011/02/gate-technologiesexpands-challenges-secondmarkets-model (describing newcomer Gate Technologies). HedgeBay,
another secondary market, is a specialty service for hedge fund interests. HEDGEBAY TRADING,
http://www.hedgebay.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
76 The companies “listed” on SecondMarket and SharesPost tend to be mature, venturebacked companies. SharesPost describes the companies on its site as typically valued at $100
million or more, having $10 million or more of annual revenue, and having been in business for
five or more years. Frequently Asked Questions, SHARESPOST, https://www.sharespost.com/pages/
faqs (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter FAQ, SHARESPOST].
77 See Gennine Kelly, Private Exchanges in ‘Dialogue’ with SEC: President SharesPost,
CNBC (Dec. 29, 2010, 3:20 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40842540/Private_Exchanges_
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requiring buyers to be QIBs or “accredited investors” and requiring sellers
to have held their shares for at least a year before selling.78 The transaction
process through these online platforms is customized, rather than standardized and immediate as on public markets. Nonetheless, the very existence of
a known marketplace may reduce transaction costs and foster network
benefits as trading becomes easier and cheaper.79
Sellers in these markets include entrepreneurs, employees, and former
employees who hold start-up stock and want to diversify or generate cash
for some other reason, as well as VCs and other early-stage investors who
wish to fund other companies or return cash to limited partners.80 The
marketplaces have reached out to potential sellers, and sellers are also
finding the marketplaces on their own.81 Buyers in these markets typically
include individuals, existing investors, late-stage VCs, hedge funds, private
equity firms, and institutional investors.82
This Section explains in more detail what these markets are, how they
work, and how they have evolved in the short time since their inception.
in_Dialogue_With_SEC_President_SharesPost (quoting SharesPost President Greg Brogger, who
said that SharesPost has “taken all those same securities laws that have always protected investors
buying private company securities and . . . wired them into a web interface”).
78 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76; Legal, SHARESPOST, https://www.sharespost.com/
pages/legal (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
79 See infra Part II. “Network benefits” refers to the notion of goods or markets in which
value is increased as others use the good or participate in the market. Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772 (1995). See generally
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 479 (1998). The private secondary markets become more useful or valuable to their users as
others also trade because more buyers and sellers in the market increases liquidity.
80 See SecondMarket’s Q1 2012 Private Company Report, SECONDMARKET (May 3, 2012),
https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/q1-2012-private-company-report [hereinafter Q1
2012, SECONDMARKET] (listing sellers by type); SecondMarket’s 2011 Year End Private Company
Report, SECONDMARKET ( Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/
secondmarkets-2011-year-end-private-company-report [hereinafter 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET] (same); see also BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 2-3 (listing reasons why sellers
may sell stock in the secondary markets).
81 See Yarow, supra note 10 (reporting that SharesPost has approached and been approached
by potential sellers).
82 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 10-11; 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80;
Q1 2012, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; see also Institutional Investor Survey Results, SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/resource/institutional-investor-survey-results
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (reporting that “most investors with exposure to private companies have
either directly transacted in the private stock secondary market or [have done so] through a
secondary fund”). Just prior to the date of this publication, SecondMarket released third quarter
data indicating that companies are engaging in share buy-back programs and that an increasing
percentage of sellers are current employees. See Q3 2012 SecondMarket Report, SECONDMARKET
(Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.secondmarket.com/education/reports/q3-2012-secondmarket-report.
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This Section contributes to the sparse literature on these markets and lays
the groundwork for subsequently exploring the beneficial role they may
play in the venture capital cycle as well as the troubling information issues
they raise.
1. SecondMarket
SecondMarket is a marketplace that matches buyers and sellers of alternative investments. Barry Silbert, a young investment-banker-turned-firsttime-entrepreneur, founded SecondMarket in 2004 with an initial focus on
restricted securities in public companies.83 In 2008, the company started to
grow significantly, developing an early version of its online platform and
expanding to include other asset classes, including private company stock,
which has since become a focal point of the site.84 In 2011, private stock
trades increased 55% on the platform and totaled $558 million in transactions.85 Over a billion dollars in private stock transactions have been
completed through the site since its launch.86 It is registered as a brokerdealer, a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
and as an “alternative trading system” (ATS) under Regulation ATS.87
83 Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 112 (2011) (statement of Barry E. Silbert, CEO, SecondMarket); see also Brad Stone, Silicon
Valley Cashes Out Selling Private Shares, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 21, 2011), http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_18/b4226070179043.htm (recounting SecondMarket’s origins as a firm called Restricted Stock Partners which sold illiquid securities).
84 See A New Vision for Capital Markets, STAN. TECH. VENTURES PROGRAM ENTREPRENEURSHIP CORNER (Apr. 13, 2011), http://ecorner.stanford.edu/authorMaterialInfo.html?
mid=2698, at 9:30-11:23 [hereinafter Silbert] (discussing SecondMarket’s shift in focus from
restricted securities to additional asset classes); see also Company Overview, SECONDMARKET,
http://www.secondmarket.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter About SecondMarket] (charting the asset classes in SecondMarket’s history, including private venture-backed
companies, private community banks, fixed income products, bankruptcy claims, and public
equity); Teitelbaum, supra note 12 (detailing Barry Silbert’s leading role in the market for private
company, social-media stock).
85 Paul Sloan, SecondMarket: Private Stock Trades Jump 55% in 2011, CNET ( Jan. 19, 2012,
10:30 AM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57361897-93/secondmarket-private-stocktrades-jump-55-in-2011.
86 See 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80.
87 About SecondMarket, supra note 84. An “[a]lternative trading system” is defined as “any
organization, association, person, group of persons, or system . . . [t]hat constitutes, maintains, or
provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for
otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)(1) (2012); see also id. § 240.3b-16(a) (defining “exchange”);
Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 853-54 (2001)
(discussing how Regulation ATS imposes minimal regulations on low-volume electronic trading
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The average sale on SecondMarket is reportedly $2 million.88 Pre-IPO
Facebook stock was the most actively traded security on the site in its first
few years, and it remains to be seen how Facebook’s transition into a public
company will affect the secondary trading marketplace.89
SecondMarket claims to have over 100,000 participants, over 20,000 of
whom have verified themselves as accredited investors.90 In 2011, about 27%
of buyers were individuals and 73% were institutional investors.91 On the
selling side, nearly 80% of sellers were former employees and 11% of sellers
were current employees.92
One of the key ways in which SecondMarket has evolved since its formation is by moving to a model in which it significantly involves the issuer
company.93 SecondMarket no longer simply connects buyers and sellers in a
systems and does not subject them to the “rigors of registration as an exchange”); Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 37-42, 45-49 (1999) (comparing the economic roles
played by ATSs and exchanges).
88 Douglas MacMillan, Facebook, Zynga Impose Fees on Private Sales of Shares, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 11, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-21/linkedin-zynga-may-usestock-sale-limits-to-curb-preipo-value-inflation.html.
89 See Maureen Farrell, Facebook IPO Shrinks Private Trading Market, CNNMONEY (Feb. 3,
2012, 1:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/03/markets/facebook_second_market/index.htm
(noting that the majority of the $1.1 billion of stock trades on SecondMarket was in Facebook stock
and questioning SecondMarket’s prospects); Lee Spears, SecondMarket Acts to Offset Facebook Fees
Selling Wine, Art, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0517/secondmarket-acts-to-offset-facebook-fees-selling-wine (noting that commissions on Facebook
trades may have generated almost a third of the company’s overall revenue); Teitelbaum, supra
note 12 (noting Facebook stock accounted for 40% of all SecondMarket private company stock
trades as of March 2011).
90 See Comment Letter from Annemarie Tierney, General Counsel, SecondMarket, to SEC
(May 25, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-16.pdf (discussing
the buyer verification process for SecondMarket’s pool of individual and institutional investors).
91 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; Steven Russolillo, SecondMarket Brags
About 2011 Results, But What Happens After Facebook Goes Public?, WALL ST. J. MARKETBEAT ( Jan.
19, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/01/19/secondmarket-brags-about-2011results-but-what-happens-after-facebook-goes-public; see also Q1 2012, SECONDMARKET, supra
note 80 (providing updated figures stating that 18.8% of buyers in the first quarter 2012 were
individuals and 70.8% were asset managers, hedge funds, family offices, and mutual funds).
92 Russolillo, supra note 91; see also 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; Q1 2012,
SECONDMARKET, supra note 80 (providing updated data for the first quarter 2012). But see supra
note 82.
93 See Silbert, supra note 84, at 24:40, 32:25 (discussing how and why SecondMarket works
directly with issuers); cf. Steven M. Davidoff, Private Markets Offer Valuable Service But Little
Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/
22/private-markets-offer-valuable-service-but-little-disclosure (noting that SecondMarket changed
its business model in 2010 to require issuers, except for Facebook, to post two years of audited
financial information).
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common marketplace as it did when it started. Rather, it now works with
companies to develop “customized liquidity program[s]” for them to control
the trading process.94 SecondMarket allows the issuer company to decide
whether to approve trading, when to allow it, the types of sellers and
investors eligible, how much stock can be traded, and how the share price is
set (e.g., as a fixed-price tender, negotiated, or in a Dutch auction).95
SecondMarket has also developed a tool that “lets private companies
interact with potential investors” and track their interest.96
Accredited investors can participate by completing a profile online, at
which point they can access company profiles and submit statements indicating interest to buy or sell private shares.97 These investors will then receive
notifications of pertinent investment opportunities, if available.98 SecondMarket typically charges a transaction fee between three and five percent,
which varies depending on the type and complexity of the transaction.99
94 Barry Silbert, Not All Markets Are Created Equal, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/28/secondmarket-sec. This model perhaps responds to some
companies’ reservations about secondary trading. See Stone, supra note 83 (discussing why some
companies might not support participation in secondary markets and the restrictions some
companies have imposed).
95 For discussions of how SecondMarket works with private companies, see Kevin Kelleher,
The SEC’s Challenge in the Secondary Market, CNNMONEY ( Jan. 4, 2011, 1:34 PM), http://tech.
fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/04/the-secs-challenge-in-the-secondary-market; Private Company Secondary
Market, SECONDMARKET, http://www.secondmarket.com/private-company (last visited Oct. 11,
2012) [hereinafter Private Company, SECONDMARKET]; Evelyn M. Rusli, Beyond Facebook,
SecondMarket Opens Its Doors to Thousands, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 10, 2011, 3:01 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/beyond-facebook-secondmarket-opens-its-doors-to-thousands;
and Barry Silbert, Comment to SecondMarket: Why Wasn’t SecondMarket Part of the
SharesPost/Secondary Market SEC Action Today?, QUORA (Mar. 15, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://www.
quora.com/SecondMarket/Why-wasnt-Secondmarket-part-of-the-SharesPost-secondary-marketSEC-action-today [hereinafter Silbert, SecondMarket].
96 Nitasha Tiku, The Future of SecondMarket in a World Without Private Facebook Shares,
BETABEAT (Feb. 3, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://betabeat.com/2012/02/03/secondmarket-facebook-ipobarry-silbert-02032012.
97 See Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95; Q1 2012, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80.
98 Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95.
99 See SecondMarket Admin, Post to SecondMarket Support: How Does SecondMarket Make
Money?, SECONDMARKET (Dec. 6, 2010, 3:52 PM), http://support.secondmarket.com/entries/
351048-how-does-secondmarket-make-money (“SecondMarket will earn a fee based on the
notional value of the transaction. The fee is determined on a case-by-case basis depending on
many factors, including, but not limited, to [sic] the asset type, value of the asset, and complexity
of the transaction.”); see also Kelleher, supra note 95 (“SecondMarket charges a transaction fee
between 3% and 5% of the proceeds raised from all private equity transactions.”); Teitelbaum, supra
note 12 (“SecondMarket could broker $1 billion in private-company shares in 2011, taking fees of
from 3 to 5 percent on each trade.”). Other fee arrangements may exist as well. See Felix Salmon,
SecondMarket’s Unnecessary Facebook Fund, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.
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While trading in the private stock of consumer internet and social media
companies has been a focal point of the site in recent years, SecondMarket
continues to evolve. Companies beyond venture-backed companies, and in
different industries, have started to participate on the platform.100 In
addition, the company may start to facilitate primary market activity,
“helping companies to sell shares directly to institutional investors as an
alternative to venture capital.”101
Commentators have reported varying levels of information disclosure on
SecondMarket. While one news article reported that companies can disclose
“[a]s much or as little as they want” and that “SecondMarket provides its
customers only the financial data that firms are willing to provide,”102
another article reported that SecondMarket “require[s] companies to
provide two years of audited financials and other information to potential
bidders” (with the exception of pre-IPO Facebook stock, for which no
information requirement existed).103 In 2011, SecondMarket’s CEO stated
that information standards have been evolving. By that time, SecondMarket
required disclosure of financial statements, balance sheets, a capitalization
table, and any risk factors if the seller was an insider such as a director,
affiliate, or manager.104 But the CEO noted a “lower level of requirement”
for sellers who were not insiders.105 To provide the private company
information to potential investors, SecondMarket maintains passwordprotected online “data rooms” where such investors can view posted
documents.106 The company has also started to offer, and even to pay for,

reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/03/20/secondmarkets-unnecessary-facebook-fund (noting that buyers
of pre-IPO Facebook shares on SecondMarket paid a three percent fee at the time of purchase and
a second three percent fee when they got the stock).
100 See Kelleher, supra note 95 (“SecondMarket sees the secondary-transaction market growing beyond a niche as private companies in other industries like biotech or consulting start
participating.”); Silbert, supra note 84, at 46:30 (discussing how SecondMarket is expanding its
private company market beyond venture capital–backed companies).
101 Kelleher, supra note 95.
102 Teitelbaum, supra note 12.
103 Davidoff, supra note 93; see also Barry Silbert, CEO of SecondMarket, NPR (May 11,
2012), at 22:25–23:14, http://www.npr.org/2012/05/11/152523244/barry-silbert-ceo-of-secondmarket
(noting that investors were willing to make certain investments, particularly in Facebook, with
limited information).
104 See Silbert, supra note 84, at 35:55–36:38 (discussing information disclosures on SecondMarket).
105 Id. at 36:45. But see id. (“[W]e essentially encourage, and we will start requiring, companies
to provide at the very least audited financials and a balance sheet.”).
106 Kelleher, supra note 95; see also Secondary Market for Private Shares: Overview and Challenges, ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, STAN. U. (May 4, 2011), at 29:45, http://

2012]

Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0

199

analyst coverage of certain companies.107 It does not, however, publicly
disclose historical pricing or valuation information from the site.108
In addition, SecondMarket has integrated aspects of social media into its
technology.109 Participants can create their own profiles that include
information about their previous investments and investment interests.110
They can also “add companies to their ‘watch lists,’” “create a network of
‘trusted’ investors” on the platform, and receive updates on their investments and auctions.111 The updates currently include digests of publicly
available information, such as news and filings.112 SecondMarket states that
it also provides updates on “[n]ew investors and funding rounds.”113
2. SharesPost
SharesPost also focuses on the secondary trading of private company
stock, and has expanded into facilitating primary offerings.114 Founded in
2009 by Greg Brogger, an entrepreneur and former Silicon Valley securities
lawyer, SharesPost claims to have more than 60,000 members115 and a

rockcenter.stanford.edu/2011/05/04/secondary-market-for-private-shares-overview-and-challenges-2/
(featuring Annemarie Tierney of SecondMarket discussing its online data rooms).
107 See Silbert, supra note 84, at 36:58 (discussing the evolution of SecondMarket’s analyst
coverage).
108 Silbert, SecondMarket, supra note 95.
109 E.g., Silbert, supra note 84, at 24:15.
110 Press Release, SecondMarket, SecondMarket Unveils Next Generation Investment
Platform (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/pressreleases/secondmarketunveils-next-generation-investment-platform.
111 Id.
112 See Rusli, supra note 95 (“SecondMarket will aggregate publicly available data, including
filings, and encourage companies to submit additional financial information.”).
113 Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95.
114 See About Us, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.sharespost.com/about-us (last visited Oct.
11, 2012) (stating SharesPost’s goals as making “the process of managing secondary liquidity and
raising primary capital easier and more transparent”); see also, e.g., Deborah L. Cohen, Going
Public, in Baby Steps, Using Secondary Markets, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/11/29/us-cohen-secondarymarkets-idUSTRE7AS1NV20111129 (discussing SharesPost’s
completion of a primary transaction); Udayan Gupta, SharesPost Helps Raise $200 Million for
TrueCar, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/
article.aspx?articleID=2904731 (detailing the same transaction).
115 Press Release, SharesPost, SharesPost Solidifies Position as Leading Marketplace for
Private Equities (Mar. 21, 2011), available for download at https://welcome.sharespost.com/newsand-events/media-center (click “Next” as needed to reach press release date). The number of
members appears to be growing over time. See Press Release, SharesPost, SharesPost’s “Market
Cap Monday” Highlights Third-Party Research Reports on Leading Private Companies (Dec. 5,
2011), available for download at https://welcome.sharespost.com/news-and-events/media-center?
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listing of over 150 companies.116 It initially structured itself as an online
“passive bulletin board,” allowing members to post offers to buy or sell
shares but without direct involvement or facilitation by SharesPost itself.117
Over time, though, its model has shifted toward a more active facilitation of
secondary transactions—a move which spurred an SEC investigation into
the company’s failure to register as a broker-dealer.118 SharesPost subsequently acquired a registered broker-dealer, registered as an alternative
trading system, and settled the administrative proceeding with the SEC.119
Unlike SecondMarket, SharesPost does not work closely with private
companies. Instead, it retains more of a marketplace-type approach between
buyers and sellers. The secondary transaction process on SharesPost begins
when a seller works with a SharesPost “transaction specialist” to post an
indication of interest to sell.120 If a buyer agrees to the terms of a seller’s
posting, the buyer can use the SharesPost system to create a form of
agreement for the transaction, which she then sends to the seller for
electronic signature.121 The parties’ identities are not disclosed to each other

page=1 (click “Next” as needed to reach press release date) (claiming “more than 83,000
members”).
116 Press Release, SharesPost, SharesPost Becomes Registered Broker-Dealer and Alternative
Trading System (Mar. 14, 2012), available for download at https://welcome.sharespost.com/newsand-events/media-center (click “Next” as needed to reach press release date).
117 Yarow, supra note 10. “Passive bulletin board” is a nontechnical term for SharesPost’s
initial structure. In organizing that structure, the company appears to have relied on a series of
SEC advisory and interpretive positions concerning registration as a broker-dealer and a national
securities exchange. Id. For examples of these no-action letters, see Oil-N-Gas, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2000 WL 1119244 ( June 8, 2000), OilOre.com, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 546573
(Apr. 21, 2000), Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 636094
(Oct. 25, 1996), Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 422670 ( June 24,
1996), and Spring Street Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 899364 (Apr. 17, 1996).
118 See SharesPost, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 66,594, 2012 WL 1029004, at *3-4 (SEC
Mar. 14, 2012) (admin. order) (noting how SharesPost evolved from serving as a bulletin board for
potential traders to an intermediary helping transactions move toward completion).
119 Id. at *5. The SEC imposed an $80,000 sanction against SharesPost for violating Section
15(a) of the Exchange Act by effecting securities transactions for the accounts of others without
registering as a broker-dealer. Id.; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Charges from
Investigation of Secondary Market Trading of Private Company Shares (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-43.htm [hereinafter SEC Press Release] (quoting Marc
Fagel, Director of the SEC’s San Francisco Regional Office, as observing, “The newly emerging
secondary marketplace for pre-IPO stock presents risk for even savvy investors . . . . Broker-dealer
registration helps ensure those who effect securities transactions can be relied upon to understand
and faithfully execute their obligations to customers and the markets. SharesPost skirted these
important provisions”).
120 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76.
121 Id.
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until both parties have signed the agreement.122 However, either party, by
clicking a button to send an e-mail, may request the other party’s identity.123
Once signed by both the buyer and seller, the agreement is considered
binding.124 The buyer can also start the same back-and-forth process with a
“post to buy” instead of “post to sell.”125
SharesPost provides the fully executed agreement to the escrow agent,
who assists the parties in navigating the issuer’s transfer process and
processes the transaction.126 Restrictive agreements on the stock, such as
rights of first refusal, can slow the transaction, but even in such circumstances closing often occurs within sixty days of providing formal notice to
the company.127
The minimum sales price for a transaction is $25,000,128 and the average
trade is about $200,000.129 SharesPost charges a fee of three percent of the
transaction or $5000, whichever is greater, as a commission for its “transaction specialists,” who facilitate the process.130 The escrow agent charges a
flat fee of $1,500 to each party.131
As with SecondMarket, participation is a limited affair. Only SharesPost
members with a password-protected account can participate.132 Registering
as a member provides basic access to the site, and once a SharesPost broker

122
123
124
125

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. In addition to this basic process for buying and selling, SharesPost also offers auctions
for interests in single-purpose funds designed to buy a particular private company stock. See
SharesPost, Inc., supra note 118, at *4 (detailing SharesPost’s model whereby “buyers were bidding
on interests in [a] fund and the fund would in turn purchase the stock”).
126 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76.
127 Id. When private companies issue stock, certain transfer restrictions or agreements are
often included, such as rights of first refusal, that can limit the transferability of the stock. See
CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS
LAW 101-02 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the “right of first refusal” and “buy-sell agreements”); Stone,
supra note 83 (describing how technology companies sometimes restrict the transferability of their
stock); see also Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice in
Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 606-09 (2005) (discussing the validity of share
transfer restrictions).
128 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76.
129 Teitelbaum, supra note 12. In contrast, the average trade on SecondMarket is $1-2 million. Id.
130 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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has confirmed that the member is qualified to invest, the individual or
entity can access additional information and purchase stock.133
Unlike SecondMarket, SharesPost does disclose historical data, including previous transaction prices, on the site.134 In addition, SharesPost has
collaborated with third-party analysts and commentators in an effort to
increase the information available to market participants trying to determine stock valuations.135
II. POTENTIAL BENEFICIAL ROLE OF SECONDARY MARKETS
FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK
Despite their different approaches, the private secondary markets serve
the same essential function: they make it easier and more efficient for
buyers and sellers of private-company stock to find one another and
transact. This intermediating or connecting function is powerful.

133 See Evelyn M. Rusli, As S.E.C. Watches, Secondary Market Seeks Transparency, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Mar. 18, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/as-s-e-c-watchessecondary-market-seeks-transparency (“Prospective clients must . . . pass a multistep qualification
process to ensure that they meet the financial requirements, including a net worth of at least $1
million or an annual salary of at least $200,000 in the last two years.”); Yarow, supra note 10
(quoting SharesPost CEO David Weir’s discussion of the company’s “multiple levels of
security”).
134 See Benefits of SharesPost for Individual Investors, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.
sharespost.com/benefits-of-sharespost/for-investors/individual-investors (last visited Oct. 11, 2012)
(indicating that members can view “historical trade data”); see also SharesPost Private Company
Share Prices Now on Bloomberg, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=BPW:GR&sid=a950RzGIeA9A (announcing Bloomberg subscribers’
access to SharesPost’s “real-time pricing” for private companies and historical data, including
prices paid and trending graphs).
135 See Third-Party Research on SharesPost, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.sharespost.com/
features/sharespost-research (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Third-Party Research,
SHARESPOST] (boasting “over 450 research reports from 11 third-party research providers”). The
quantity of the third-party research provided by SharesPost appears to be growing steadily. See
Rusli, supra note 133 (reporting 230 available research reports available as of March 2011). For a
period of time, SharesPost provided an index tracking a small number of venture-backed private
companies as a reference point for valuation. Brian Caulfield, SharesPost Launches Index, FORBES
(Mar. 3, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/velocity/2010/03/03/sharespost-launchesindex (reporting SharesPost’s launch of “what it says is the first index to track the performance of
venture-backed private companies”); see also Jay Gould, Buyer Beware: SharesPost Index Under
Values LinkedIn by Billions, SECOND SHARES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.secondshares.com/2010/
03/30/buyer-beware-sharespost-index-under-values-linkedin-by-billions (criticizing the SharesPost
Index and noting that “providing incomplete and insufficient data when determining valuations is
unprofessional at best, and potentially very dangerous to these potential buyers on their
exchange”).
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While shares in a private company have previously been transferable,
notwithstanding certain contractual restrictions and the constraints of
registration exemptions, in practice the market has been notably illiquid and
ad hoc.136 Finding a buyer or seller has been difficult. Imagine a potential
investor decides she wants to invest in a particular private company stock.
Without inside connections, she has no way to know whether any shareholders in that company are willing to sell or whether a seller may sell the
stock within an available exemption from registration. These obstacles could
prevent the transaction from occurring. SharesPost and SecondMarket
provide centralized sites for buyers and sellers to overcome these obstacles
and transact.
In addition to reducing search costs, the private secondary markets may
also lower the parties’ transaction costs in carrying out the trade. Before the
rise of these platforms, it had been notoriously difficult for outsiders to
value private company shares without extensive due diligence.137 While the
platforms charge fees for their services, they lower transaction costs by
providing some, albeit limited, information for valuing stock. For its part,
SecondMarket has started involving the issuer companies in their transaction process, which seems to have generally resulted in more disclosure.138
SharesPost, on the other hand, provides information such as recent buy-sell
bids, contract prices, and third-party research reports.139 Both also provide
form agreements, electronic signature functions, escrow services, and
assistance in navigating any issuer restrictions on the stock.140 These
functions all serve to lower the cost of secondary transactions in private
company stock.
Thus, the secondary markets make it easier and more efficient for buyers
and sellers to identify each other and transact. Moreover, as the secondary
markets lower search and transaction costs, the network may grow, and the

136 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 83 (describing secondary transactions before the new markets as
“carefully negotiated affairs,” and quoting a Silicon Valley financier who stated they were “very
occasional transactions . . . done the old-fashioned way . . . [by] earn[ing] the respect and trust of
the company”).
137 Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 21-22.
138 See supra notes 93-95, 105, and accompanying text.
139 See supra 134-35 and accompanying text.
140 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76; Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95; see
also SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 12 (“Most direct secondary transactions necessitate the
waiving of rights or privileges by the company and existing investors, the executing of a stock
transfer agreement with the company, and the adoption and adherence to existing operative
documents by the new investor.”).
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liquidity of private company stock may increase.141 Although the market
remains relatively illiquid, the increase in liquidity of private company stock
may benefit stockholders as well as start-up companies.142
As for liquidity benefits to stockholders, the secondary markets provide an
exit option at the individual level, rather than at the company level as with an
acquisition or IPO. This individual exit option is particularly important
because “[t]he ability to control exit is crucial to the venture capitalist’s
business model,”143 and the venture capital industry has faced a declining IPO
market and longer average time before a company is acquired or goes
public.144 Furthermore, employees in start-up companies have also faced
difficulty with illiquidity, as few people want to wait ten years or more before being able to cash in on stock options awarded as incentive compensation.
Increased liquidity for stockholders may in turn create ex ante benefits
for start-up companies. With more exit opportunities, investors may be less
inclined to price an “illiquidity premium” into their potential investments.145 This may lead to more start-ups receiving funding than might
otherwise occur without the secondary markets.146 “By offering a market
price and exit transaction at any stage . . . the secondary market can help
promote allocation to venture in the first place.”147
141 It is worth underscoring that increased liquidity does not necessarily mean a great deal of
liquidity. There were only 689 transactions of Facebook stock on SecondMarket between 2008
and early 2012, and it was one of the most heavily traded stocks on the site. Felix Salmon, How to
Make $50 Million Trading Facebook Shares, REUTERS (May 18, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/
felix-salmon/2012/05/18/how-to-make-250-million-trading-facebook-shares. Moreover, tertiary
trades are uncommon. See Felix Salmon, How SecondMarket Works, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/04/12/how-secondmarket-works (reporting “maybe half
a dozen instances” of tertiary trades).
142 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 21 (“The increased liquidity offered by the [secondary]
market has both ex post benefits for individual investors looking to sell and ex ante benefits for
nascent start-ups that need funding.”); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider
Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 n.8 (2001)
(“A securities market is liquid when investors can buy or sell shares on very short notice.” (citing
JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 7 (1991))).
143 Smith, supra note 20, at 316; see also supra Section I.A.
144 The secondary markets could be particularly useful for “angel investors” who may tend to
have more concentrated portfolios than VCs. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1424 (2008) (discussing research suggesting
angel investors tend to be less diversified in investments than venture capitalists). “Angel
investors are wealthy individuals who personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups
as venture capitalists but at an earlier stage.” Id. at 1406.
145 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 22-23 (explaining that venture capital investors demand a
higher rate of return on illiquid investments, which in turns makes investment less likely).
146 See id. at 23-24.
147 BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 8.
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The secondary markets may provide additional benefits beyond increased liquidity. In the other scholarly article published to date on the
secondary markets, Darian Ibrahim explored their beneficial role in the
start-up and venture capital environment, specifically identifying improved
corporate governance benefits as well as greater liquidity.148 Ibrahim argues
that entrepreneurs and VCs can use the threat of a secondary market exit to
reduce each other’s opportunistic conduct in the management of the firm.149
Further, he argues that the secondary markets can mitigate conflicts
between VCs and entrepreneurs over traditional exits.150 That is, the
secondary markets provide a “release valve” that allows the party seeking an
early exit to sell her stake separately and avoid forcing the start-up as a
whole into a suboptimal exit.151 These potential benefits come, however,
with a host of concerns that the next Part explores.
III. INFORMATION ISSUES IN THE SECONDARY MARKETS
FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK
Regulators have begun to examine the secondary markets and to debate
whether they should encourage these markets by loosening the legal
strictures constraining their growth, or, conversely, whether they should

148 See generally Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 24-27. See also Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note
14, at 16 (“Without sufficiently clear options to exit from portfolio firms, it would be difficult to
align the interests of the entrepreneurs and those who invest in a company during the different
stages of its development.”).
149 Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 26; see also BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 7 (observing that “investors and management teams are increasingly viewing the secondary market as a
method to provide liquidity to help solve a wide range of issues, from employee motivation to
litigation and severance situations”).
150 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 29 (“The party seeking the early exit can sell in the direct
market . . . .”); BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 7-8 (noting that secondary markets may
give venture capital firms greater ability to manage venture capital assets in a portfolio, such as by
adjusting their risk and return in a fund, or achieving partial liquidity on some of their investments before a traditional exit for a portfolio company).
151 Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 29. This potential benefit may come with the corresponding
concerns, however, that allowing employees to sell their stock lowers their incentives to exert
effort in the company, and that allowing VCs to exit may lead to less vigorous monitoring. See
Stone, supra note 83 (“Now some founders and employees are motivated to leave before the IPO
because they are free to cash out . . . .”); cf. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to
Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform 24 (Apr. 6, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf [hereinafter Schapiro]
(noting that outside investors cannot monitor private companies like public companies because of
limited disclosure and that VCs are by contrast “value-added investors”).
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regulate these marketplaces more strictly.152 The potential benefits discussed
in Part II suggest that the secondary markets should be encouraged, because
they increase liquidity and may foster the venture capital cycle, which
contributes to innovation and economic growth.153
But to focus only on the markets’ potential benefits leaves significant
issues unexplored. Specifically, concern has been rising about the lack of
information and the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers in
the secondary markets. This apprehension relates to both the quality and
amount of information being disclosed.154 Underlying these concerns is the
larger worry that without an adequate amount of accurate information,
private company stock cannot be properly valued.155 Furthermore, the
concern about asymmetric information raises questions about the related
issue of insider trading.
Imperfect or asymmetric information is, of course, a common issue in
contracting.156 In some cases the law intervenes, and in some it does not.
Public securities laws provide an example of regulatory intervention. In
many contexts, though, parties can address information issues on their own
through contract, or they can agree to a price that reflects the uncertainty
surrounding their contract.157 Thus, the decision of whether to regulate

152 See Schapiro, supra note 151, at 21-22 (“Trading that develops on online trading platforms . . . can provide much desired liquidity to investors, which can assist in attracting investors
to smaller private companies. This benefit, however, must be balanced with investor protection
concerns . . . .”).
153 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 36, 47 (noting that the markets “must continue to develop for
their benefits to be fully realized” and that “[g]iven the surplus that entrepreneurial activity
produces for society, VC secondary markets should be . . . encouraged by policymakers”).
154 See Schapiro, supra note 151, at 22 (discussing the “lack of information available to investors”).
155 For a discussion of why inaccurate stock prices may be undesirable in the public securities
context, see Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE
L.J. 977 (1992). But see Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 186-89
(2010) (arguing that share-price accuracy as a theory of regulation lacks an “intellectual core”).
156 For classic literature in economics and contract theory on imperfect information and
information asymmetry, see generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Michael Rothschild & Joseph
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); and
Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
157 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 15, at 1076 (“All financial contracts respond to three central
problems: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs.”);
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2007
(1987) (“Parties enter into continuing contractual relationships in order to exploit the economic
benefits of long-term planning and coordination. Even so, contingencies may later materialize and
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requires an analysis of the information issues that exist in the private
secondary markets and a determination whether the markets and parties are
equipped to respond well to these issues without regulatory intervention.
To that end, this Part first examines the issues of lack of information,
asymmetric information, and conflicts of interest, and then turns to
insider trading.
A. Lack of Information, Asymmetric Information, and Conflicts of Interest
The starting point for the information issues in the private secondary
markets is that, by nature, generally less information is publicly available
about private companies than public ones because private companies do not
have public disclosure obligations.158 Private companies are often hesitant to
disclose information, and for good reason—their competitors can benefit by
knowing their business plans and financial information.159 It is accordingly
common for employees, consultants, and stockholders of private companies
to be bound by confidentiality agreements as a condition of employment or
share purchase. Further, many private companies are keen to avoid the
greater scrutiny to which regulators and shareholders often subject public
companies.
In addition, the transactions on these marketplaces are secondary—
meaning that the company itself is not a party to the transaction and the
seller is an existing shareholder. The company is not, as a general matter,
obligated to disclose information to facilitate secondary transactions. The
seller may not have significant information about the company, or may have
signed a confidentiality agreement with the company and therefore may not
be at liberty to disclose it. The Rule 144 exemption for resale of restricted
stock does not impose an information disclosure requirement on nonaffiliate sellers.160
As a result, unless the company or seller voluntarily discloses information or it is otherwise available—such as in a third-party analyst report or
publicly available information—the buyer may possess little information
frustrate the parties’ efforts to realize these shared objectives. Anticipating this, contracting parties
must distribute between themselves the risks of their enterprise.”).
158 This Article focuses on information about U.S. private companies. Note that there are
substantial differences in how other countries regulate disclosure by private companies. See, e.g.,
Benito Arruñada, Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private Companies 32 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 377, 378 (2011) (providing an overview of European Union practices, which require all
private companies to register with a public registry).
159 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 25.
160 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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when deciding whether to purchase stock at the offered price. The buyer
faces the risk that the stock will be valued at a lower price when the
company eventually discloses information.
The amount and quality of publicly available information about private
companies varies widely. Some companies are relatively early-stage or have
not attracted much attention, and consequently very little information
about them is available. By contrast, a fairly substantial amount of information may be available about mature, private companies in the public eye.
Examples of such information include the company’s certificate of incorporation, which is a public document, and press releases regarding products,
customers, or strategic partners.161
Potential buyers might give weight to the reputation value of other
known investors in a private company, such as well-respected venture
capital firms. However, without a capitalization table or financing documents, it is difficult to know how large a stake an investor has in the
company, at what stage it invested, and whether the investor has since sold
part of its position.
Some private companies are the subject of reporting on sites such as
Second Shares and TechCrunch or more general media such as the Wall
Street Journal and the New York Times.162 Deal term data may even be
available in databases such as VC Experts.163
The Internet, meanwhile, can also be a source of information, but that
information can be strategically disclosed or unreliable.164 For instance,
when Bloomberg recently cited Twitter insiders as the source of sales
projections for the distant future, other commentators speculated that they
might have released this information for public relations purposes or to
“boost the reputation of Twitter to move some stock on private markets like
161
162

See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 19.
See generally About, SECOND SHARES, http://www.secondshares.com/about (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012); About TechCrunch, TECHCRUNCH, http://www.techcrunch.com/about (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012). See also, e.g., Amir Efrati & Spencer E. Ante, Twitter Seeks $7 Billion Valuation,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 2011, at B1 (reporting on the financing of Twitter, a private company);
Thomas Kaplan, Facebook Announces 5-for-1 Stock Split, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:37
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/facebook-announces-5-to-1-stock-split (providing
coverage of the financial maneuverings of Facebook when it was a private company).
163 See About Us, VC EXPERTS, https://www.vcexperts.com/vce/about-us (last visited Oct. 11,
2012) (“VC Experts provides specialized content on private equity & venture capital fundraising,
valuations and deal term details on thousands of privately funded companies . . . .”).
164 Cf. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By The Light: Information Overload And Its Consequences For
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 475 & n.266 (2003) (noting that “the presentation of
information . . . can be manipulated, for better or worse” and discussing the Internet as a source of
information).
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SharesPost and SecondMarket.”165 Moreover, one simply cannot find on the
web all of the information that is typically considered key to properly
valuing private company stock, including the “[r]ecent company capitalization table[, c]orporate documents (charter, bylaws, and investment agreements)[, h]istorical and projected financials of the company[, and] recent
board presentations and/or minutes.”166 One secondary market investor
explained he made investment decisions “going by gut,” which he described
as saying to himself, “I like the product. I think the company’s doing well.
The news that I read on TechCrunch or AllThingsD[igital] or any one of
these technology blogs, it all looks good.”167 This investor noted that when
electric car manufacturer Tesla went public he discovered that the company
whose stock he had purchased had been losing money.168 He commented,
“If I had actually known what the financials looked like, I would not have
invested in Tesla.”169
Third-party information, such as the research reports available on
SharesPost,170 likewise varies in quality and amount. SharesPost offers over
450 research reports from eleven third-party research providers.171 While
this third-party research adds to the information available about a company’s
stock, it is not a prospectus.172 Without comprehensive information from
the company itself, third-party researchers likely have trouble providing
robust valuation estimates. Furthermore, third-party researchers with
undisclosed conflicts of interest might mislead potential market participants, a point discussed in more detail below.

165 Erik Sherman, Is Twitter Leaking to the Media to Primp for IPO?, CBS NEWS ( June 4, 2012,
5:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-57446882/is-twitter-leaking-to-the-media-toprimp-for-ipo.
166 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 17.
167 Ilya Marritz, Hunting for Hot Stocks, Some Investors Head to Private Markets, WNYC NEWS
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/apr/30/hunting-hot-stocks-someinvestors-head-private-markets (alteration in original).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
171 See Third-Party Research, SHARESPOST, supra note 135 (listing available research reports).
172 SharesPost subsidizes some of the research. See Third-Party Research, SHARESPOST, supra
note 135 (“SharesPost is not the author of these reports but rather is only distributing research
from a variety of independent sources. In some cases, SharesPost subsidizes the research presented
on its platform.”).
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In addition to providing third-party reports, SharesPost provides pricing data about contracts that have been executed through its site,173 which
increases transparency in the market to a degree. Indeed, SharesPost
adopted this policy of posting trading histories, and having its brokers
review price postings before they go live on the website, after significant
efficiency flaws came to light.174 In January 2011, for example, some investors agreed to trade then-private Facebook stock for $60 a share, more than
twice the price other investors paid that day.175 Efficiency flaws of this type
may persist, however, particularly since SecondMarket does not post such
trading history and the prices on the two markets may not always be the
same.176
More importantly, the trading history information, if available, may be
of limited value if the other offers and transactions were also made without
the information necessary to accurately price the stock. That is, the information SharesPost discloses about offers and contracts may inform potential
participants about market activity, but these transactions may not bear
much relation to the company fundamentals if critical information is not
available. Market participants who buy and sell stock without knowledge of
underlying fundamentals may propagate stock mispricing.177
Thus, the bottom line is that market participants may have little to no
information of the type typically considered necessary for accurate pricing.
Varying amounts of other information may be available, but it may be
inaccurate and misleading. Further, it would seem that investors cannot rely

173 Davidoff, supra note 93; SharesPost Media FAQ: 2012, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.
sharespost.com (click “News and Events,” then click “Media Center,” then click “Download”
under “SharesPost Media FAQ”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
174 See Teitelbaum, supra note 12 (calling trades of private company stock based on minimal
data a “leap of faith”).
175 Id.
176 See id. (contrasting SecondMarket’s practice of non-posting with SharesPost’s); see also
Pui-Wing Tam & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Hot Trade in Private Shares of Facebook, WALL ST. J., Dec.
28, 2010, at A1 (noting that in December 2010, the average valuation of Facebook based on
SharesPost transactions had risen about 25%, while Facebook’s valuation based on SecondMarket
transactions had risen only about 12%).
177 A variety of market participants have made this observation. See, e.g., Bo Brustkern,
Response to Are Secondary Markets Helping to Overvalue Private Companies?, QUORA (Dec. 18,
2010), http://www.quora.com/Are-secondary-markets-helping-to-overvalue-private-companies (“As a
valuation expert, I believe that the majority of transactions taking place in today’s secondary
markets are not reflective of Fair Value . . . I would say that a majority—if not an absolute union—
of my peers [who attended a Fair Value Forum meeting] are in agreement with me on that.”).
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on efficiencies of the market for protection because stocks in these markets
can be thinly traded and trades are not immediate.178
Adding to the concern about the sufficiency of information is the issue
of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. Specifically, the
concern is that investors and business insiders who have had access to
information about the finances and direction of the company constitute one
side of the market, while individual and institutional investors who do not
have such access or knowledge constitute the other side.179
The concern stems from the notion that in the world of venture capital–
backed companies, nearly every early investor and employee has access to
inside information. That changes as the company grows, and there are
certainly exceptions, but on the whole it is an aspect of the culture and
economic dynamic of start-ups, particularly in Silicon Valley’s technology
sector. VCs are known for providing “smart money”—they are not passive
investors, but rather knowledgeable, savvy investors that actively try to help
the company grow, with large investors often taking a seat on the board.180
Meanwhile, buyers in secondary markets can be anyone meeting the
accredited-investor or QIB standard.181 Hence, asymmetries can arise in
many ways. A buyer might be a venture capital firm trying to increase its
position, and the seller could be a former employee who was not, or is no
longer, privy to company information. Or, perhaps more likely, the
asymmetry could arise because the seller is someone with experience at the
company, such as a current or former employee, and the buyer is an
individual or institution with no such connection. Plus, the asymmetry is
not always detectable. The buyer may not know the identity of the seller
until after signing the purchase agreement.182
A particular concern regarding asymmetric information is where a conflict of interest exists. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro recently acknowledged this concern, stating, “In the absence of an informed market,
178 Cf. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1001 (“[T]he reasonable expectations investors
have that they can rely on securities prices as approximating fundamental value is a cornerstone of
securities market integrity.”).
179 For a discussion of problems arising from informational asymmetries, see Stephen J. Choi, A
Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45 (2004).
180 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 15, at 1070-76 (providing an overview of the structure of
American venture capital); Thomas F. Hellmann, Venture Capitalists: The Coaches of Silicon Valley,
in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE 276, 276 (Chong-Moon Lee et al. eds., 2000) (explaining the role
that venture capitalists play in the development of start-up companies).
181 See supra notes 52 & 78 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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concerns can be raised that pricing of securities may be influenced by
conflicted market participants who may be buying and selling for their own
account as well as facilitating transactions for other buyers and sellers.”183
Because conflicts may go undisclosed, it is difficult to gauge the extent to
which conflicted participants pervade the secondary markets.
However, the media has reported on at least a handful of examples of
conflicts of interest. Last year, Global Silicon Valley Partners posted a
research note about then-private Facebook stock, valuing it at a significantly lower price than the price at which its affiliate concurrently bought
it.184 Another example includes investment firm GreenCrest Capital,
which provides a research service that compiles financial reports on
popular start-ups, while also offering single-company and blended funds of
stock in the same private companies.185 The research service is “led by a
team of former analysts at Wall Street firms [who] draw from publicly
available information and interviews with the company’s investors, employees and industry experts.”186 GreenCrest takes only institutional investors as
clients, and has pointed to that approach as mitigating the conflict of
interest. “There is a conflict of interest to some extent—we do seek to do
business with the companies we cover. However, our investors will keep
that in mind before they make their investment decisions.”187
Finally, tales of conflicts of interest abound in Silicon Valley, the geographic home of many of the start-up companies whose stock is traded on
secondary markets. Legendary venture capitalist John Doerr of Kleiner
Perkins is rumored to have once said “no conflict, no interest” in describing
183 Schapiro, supra note 151, at 22. Earlier this year, the SEC filed charges against two managers
of private company stock funds and their firms for engaging in improper self-dealing by charging
investors undisclosed fees. See SEC Press Release, supra note 119 (announcing the charges); Sarah
N. Lynch & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Charges SharesPost, Felix Over Pre-IPO Trading, REUTERS (Mar.
14, 2012, 7:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-sec-sharespostidUSBRE82D1B420120314
(discussing the SEC’s suits against Felix Investments and its manager, which is pending, and the
SEC’s charges against EB Financial Group and its manager, which settled).
184 Davidoff, supra note 93. Global Silicon Valley Partners, a research provider for private
company valuation, published a research note with a valuation of Facebook around $52 billion
while an affiliate purchased shares of the company at a valuation around $68 billion. Id. The
affiliate later explained that the research provider is now defunct and the research was in fact
outsourced and independently produced, and there was not an economic relationship between the
research producer and the affiliate that bought the stock. Id. However, this explanation does not
assuage the concern that an affiliate might pay or otherwise encourage research reports to suggest
valuations that would put the affiliate in an advantageous position for buying or selling.
185 See Rusli, supra note 133.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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his investment views.188 While such a statement may have been only rumor,
Silicon Valley is a small world for some investors. Doerr sits on the board
of Google, which is said to have made a “soft bid” to acquire Twitter in
2010.189 In late 2010, Kleiner Perkins invested $150 million in Twitter.190
Several months later, Doerr “raised eyebrows” with his participation in a
Twitter board meeting as an “observer.”191 Around the time of its Twitter
investment, Kleiner Perkins also reportedly invested in Groupon, another
company that Google tried to acquire, and in Facebook, an emerging
competitor to Google.192
Perhaps responding to the perceived information problems, as noted in
subsection I.B.1, SecondMarket has recently changed its model to require
company approval for secondary transactions.193 In doing so, it has generally
required that companies provide two years of financials as well as other
information.194 One reason a company might agree to such disclosure is to
exert some influence over the selection of secondary buyers. The company
may not otherwise have specific rights to control the stock sale process, and
managing “to whom and how the information is shared” allows the company
to exert some influence.195 The company may not be concerned about the
identity of the investor if the stake is small, but it may be a more significant
consideration if the secondary buyer will acquire a significant voting
position.196 Companies may wish to avoid having competitors become

188 Henry Blodget, No Conflict, No Interest: John Doerr, Twitter, and the Rise of Secondary
Private Markets, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-11/tech/
30001236_1_twitter-twitter-board-investment.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. Investors in venture capital–backed companies sometimes receive board “observation
rights,” which give them the ability to sit in on board meetings and thereby get information about
the company’s direction. Observation rights may exclude the observer from full participation in
the board meeting, such as during the executive sessions. See id. (contextualizing Doerr’s role as a
“board observer” at the Twitter board meetings); see also David Snow, Disparity Meets Liquidity,
PRIVCAP (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.privcap.com/snowsnotes/2011/03/disparity-meets-liquidity
(explaining that “[e]ven investors who have no board or executive role at the corporate level are
often given board ‘observations rights,’ meaning the ability to sit in on board meetings”).
192 See Blodget, supra note 188 (noting that Kleiner Perkins invested in companies that are
potential partners or competitors of Google, where Doerr sits on the board of directors).
193 Davidoff, supra note 93.
194 Id.
195 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 30.
196 See id. (explaining that the identity of secondary investors “should be an important consideration if the secondary buyer will have a meaningful voting position amongst the shareholders
or if they will play [a] role as a board member or observer”).
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stockholders and to require that potential buyers sign a confidentiality or
nondisclosure agreement with the company.197
Companies may also be willing to disclose information for other reasons.
They may have concerns about the accuracy of the pricing or about securing
the best pricing for their stock.198 They may want to support private trading
to provide some liquidity to shareholders or employees, or to manage their
total number of shareholders so as to avoid triggering the Section 12(g)
threshold that would require the company to go public.199 Finally, companies may wish to establish an insider trading policy and open limited
trading windows with information disclosure, a point discussed in more
detail below.
However, companies may not want to disclose all of the information
that SecondMarket recommends. As discussed at the outset of this Section,
many private companies want to avoid disclosing information that would
benefit their competitors, and they generally want to avoid greater scrutiny.
Companies may still have other reasons for not wanting to facilitate trading
in their stock, including concerns about liability and employee retention.200
197 See id. at 25 (“Once a potential buyer has indicated a sufficient level of interest in the
transaction, they will be willing to sign a confidentiality agreement with the company, at which
point the company can share a more substantial amount of information.”). The company may also
insist that the buyer sign and acknowledge that the information was provided “as a convenience”
and have the selling stockholder “indemnify the company from any claim arising from the
accuracy or incompleteness of the information provided.” Id. at 26.
198 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 25 (describing the reservations that companies have
about disclosing information to the secondary investor markets).
199 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. For example, by working with SecondMarket a company could arrange for multiple shareholders to sell to one buyer, thereby reducing the
total number of shareholders of record.
200 Companies may view the secondary markets as having “created a legal quagmire that
must be navigated.” Stone, supra note 83. Companies may be concerned about employee effort and
retention. Cf. supra note 32. In addition, companies may be concerned about losing control over
the shareholder base, inadvertently exceeding the record-holder threshold for going public, and
valuation concerns regarding incentive compensation and an IPO. Today’s Marketplace for Securities
of Pre-Public Companies and How We Got Here, CORP. COUNS., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 1, 3-4,
available at https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Corporate-CounselTodays-Marketplace-for-Securities-of-Pre-Public-Companies.pdf. And, although not a party to the
secondary transaction, a company might be concerned about liability related to information it
provides in connection with that process. Compliance with a registration exemption does not
preclude liability under anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, such as Rule 10b-5 governing
omissions or misstatements. See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 26 (noting that the “law is
ambiguous as to whether the provision of information creates what is called a Rule 10b-5 liability
obligation from the company to the purchaser” and discussing best practices for a company to
avoid liability); J.J. Colao, ‘An Abomination That Should Stop’: What’s the Problem with Secondary
Markets?, FORBES (June 29, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/06/29/
an-abomination-that-should-stop-whats-the-problem-with-secondary-markets (noting the concern
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Given that SecondMarket makes money by charging fees for the transactions it facilitates, one might expect that its interests would sometimes
diverge from requiring what would otherwise be optimal levels of information to those contemplating a trade. Reports suggested that SecondMarket did not require information disclosures from Facebook for secondary
trading of its private shares.201 Facebook was the most actively traded stock
on SecondMarket before Facebook went public, and the source of a
significant portion of SecondMarket’s revenue.202 Hence, SecondMarket’s
move to a model of working with companies to develop liquidity programs
that include some information disclosure suggests that the market is
responding to the problem—but the response may be insufficient. It is
unclear whether all companies “listed” on SecondMarket have disclosed
information and whether disclosures are of the type and amount that suffice
to address the information concerns. Furthermore, it seems the information
released to potential buyers is not standardized and so the company’s
disclosures may be limited and selective.
As we have seen, SharesPost does not require company involvement at all,
apart from clearing any contractual restrictions on the stock. Its adaptations
have been to provide historical trading data and third-party research
reports. Consequently, while the private secondary markets have made
some effort to promote information disclosure, they still raise concerns
about the adequacy of the information available.
Among participants, the markets have started to get the reputation of facilitating transactions “executed more on public perception rather than investing
fundamentals.”203 Thus, despite the potential for private ordering to address
the information issues in these markets, such an approach may be failing.204
that companies whose stock is traded in secondary markets may face lawsuits); Memorandum
from Goodwin Procter LLP to Annemarie Tierney, Gen. Counsel, SecondMarket Holdings, Inc. 3
(Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Goodwin Procter Memo], available at https://www.secondmarket.
com/discover/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Memo-on-Secondary-Sale-Disclosure-RequirementsGoodwin-Proctor.pdf (discussing Rule 10b-5 and noting there is no anti-fraud safe harbor).
201 See Davidoff, supra note 93; supra text accompanying note 103.
202 See Spears, supra note 89 (reporting on the fees that Facebook trading brought to SecondMarket before going public).
203 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 10-11.
204 While it is difficult, if not dangerous, to draw conclusions from a single case, the Facebook IPO may suggest flawed price discovery in the secondary markets. In the weeks after its May
2012 IPO, Facebook stock fell to a price which had not been seen on private secondary markets
since 2010. Compare Facebook on SecondMarket, SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.
com/facebook-on-secondmarket (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (providing a history of Facebook share
prices on SecondMarket), with Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Shares Dive as Deadline for Insider Sales
Nears, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-facebook-
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B. Insider Trading
In addition to the broader issue of information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers, a more specific concern exists about insider trading in
these new markets.205 Before the rise of these marketplaces, privately
negotiated secondary transactions were possible but more difficult and
costly to arrange.206 Buyers and sellers had to find each other without a
central marketplace. Parties shared their identities, and the transactions
were often heavily negotiated after extensive due diligence by the buyer for
the purposes of valuing the stock and reducing information asymmetry and
the opportunity for insider trading. Now, the online marketplaces provide
the possibility of anonymity between the buyer and seller before the
agreement is signed and a process which does less to reduce information
asymmetry. This Section explores the concerns about insider trading in the
private secondary markets.
As a starting point, insider trading prohibitions are phrased broadly,
applying to both public and private securities. Specifically, Rule 10b-5,
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, provides that its
fraud prohibitions apply “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”207
Rule 10b-5 has developed into the SEC’s principal legal source for insider
trading liability.208 Congress has not clearly defined insider trading, but the
core notion developed through case law is that insider trading occurs when
someone buys or sells securities on the basis of material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or a relationship of trust or confidence.209 Such trading constitutes a “deceptive device” under section 10(b)

shares-idUSBRE8711AS20120802 (reporting that the Facebook public share price dropped
below $20).
It would be imprudent to draw conclusions from this one example, however, because many
factors contributed to the Facebook IPO and its subsequent pricing. With time, there will be more
data to study the relationship between trading on private secondary markets and IPO pricing or
pricing on a public market.
205 For a discussion of the rationale for distinguishing insider trading from unobjectionable
trading on informational advantages, see generally Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 329-33 (1979).
206 See Stone, supra note 83, and accompanying text.
207 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (emphasis added).
208 See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL
§ 3.01 (2011).
209 See generally Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 J. CORP.
L. 343, 345-53 (2011) (noting that Congress and the SEC have not promulgated a definition of
insider trading and discussing the history of insider trading law). Materiality is a fact-specific
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and Rule 10b-5. Under current insider trading law, liability can arise in a
few distinct ways.210 Under the “classical theory,” an insider is required to
disclose her material nonpublic information before trading, or abstain from
trading, if she owes a fiduciary duty to her trading partner.211 A “tippee” can
be held liable in the same way if her “tipper” has such a duty.212 Under
the “misappropriation theory,” a trader is subject to Rule 10b-5 liability
when she misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach of a
fiduciary duty to the source of the information.213
Notably, the key insider trading cases have developed in the context of
trading public company stock.214 Although the language of Rule 10b-5
includes private company stock, insider trading actions against private
securities traders have been nearly nonexistent to date.215 That may be
because historically there has not been an active market for trading private
company securities. And while liability is theoretically possible, given the
broad phrasing of Rule 10b-5, the concept of insider trading is a somewhat
problematic fit in the context of secondary transactions in private company
shares.

inquiry which looks at whether there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information made available.” Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318
(2011) (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)). For a discussion of how courts
and the SEC have often ignored or disregarded fiduciary principles in insider trading cases despite
the Supreme Court’s dictates, see generally Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual
Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1336-64 (2009).
210 In addition to the bases for liability discussed here, Rule 14e-3 prohibits traders from
buying or selling securities using inside information related to a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(2012).
211 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
212 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty . . . not
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach.”).
213 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); see also id. at 658 (“The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)’s language, which requires deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser or
seller.”).
214 See supra notes 211-13.
215 One rare example includes a recent SEC enforcement proceeding involving a private
company’s repurchasing of shares from employees at prices that did not reflect undisclosed higher
third-party valuations and acquisition offers. See WINSTON & STRAWN, SEC RENEWS FOCUS
ON INSIDER TRADING IN PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK (2011), available at http://www.winston.
com/sitefiles/publications/SEC_Briefing_12_20_11%20(2).pdf (discussing SEC v. Stiefel Labs.
Inc., No. 11-24438 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 12, 2011)).
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For example, at the first level, there is a question of what information is
actually public about a private company. As noted in Section III.A, private
companies are not subject to mandatory disclosure rules like public companies. There is therefore not a base level of publicly available information
about private companies, and they do not file periodic reports to update
information. Indeed, there may be very little publicly available information
about a private company, and much of the company’s finances and other
material information may be nonpublic.
Another challenge is that the proportion of shareholders with access to
material nonpublic information is likely significantly greater in the private
company context than the public one. Existing shareholders in venturebacked private companies have typically become shareholders by being
founders who helped establish the business, investors who acquired shares
in a round of venture financing involving due diligence, or employees,
former employees, or consultants awarded stock options as incentive
compensation for their work for the company.216 All of these categories of
shareholders might have inside knowledge about the company that may be
material with regard to stock valuation. Furthermore, existing shareholders
may be subject to company confidentiality agreements that reflect the
private company’s desire to keep information private.
Together, these differences suggest that a significant number of participants in the secondary markets may have material nonpublic information
along with a corresponding duty to the company not to disclose that
information. As a result, insider trading may be prevalent or difficult to
avoid in secondary markets. The lack of public information about these
companies and the proportion of people with access to material nonpublic
information also raise the question of whether such holders can still buy or
sell in a secondary transaction without violating insider trading laws. And
without the participation of these shareholders, the secondary markets may
be significantly constrained and fail to fully realize the benefits discussed in
Part II.
There are limited ways that insider participants might avoid or minimize insider trading, apart from simply abstaining from trading. One
possibility would be for a company to agree to disclose all material information to the potential buyer—or at least all the material information that
the existing shareholder has, on an ad hoc basis. For instance, SecondMarket itself has recently arranged a share tender for its own stock, which it
216 See Russolillo, supra note 91 (noting that, on SecondMarket, nearly eighty percent of
sellers in the past year were ex-employees and eleven percent of sellers were current employees).
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stated is the first of many liquidity events the company plans to arrange for
its shareholders.217 In arranging such a liquidity event, the company can
eliminate information disparities between buyers and sellers by allowing the
sellers to share any material nonpublic information in their possession, and
the company can require buyers to sign confidentiality agreements.
Another possibility would be for a company to move to a more formal
public company–style compliance program. While for many years a myth
existed in Silicon Valley that insider trading rules did not apply to private
company stocks,218 that understanding has been changing with the rise of
secondary marketplaces and some private companies have started adopting
insider trading policies.219 An insider trading policy could provide for
trading windows with disclosures, as well as black-out periods, such as when
the company is fundraising, executing or discussing material transactions, or
around the end of the fiscal quarter or year.220 The company might also
refrain from granting “observation rights,” which give an investor the
ability to sit in on board meetings.221

217 See Lizette Chapman, SecondMarket Shareholders Cash Out at $160M Valuation in Secondary
Deal, DOW JONES PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL (Sept. 28, 2011), http://pevc.dowjones.
com/Article?an=DJFPEA0020110928e79s0002t (reporting that SecondMarket allowed its
shareholders to sell $13 million worth of shares based on a company valuation of $160 million).
218 See, e.g., John Carney, Does Silicon Valley Have an Insider Trading Problem?, CNBC (Apr.
1, 2011, 1:10 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/42377452/Does_Silicon_Valley_Have_an_Insider_
Trading_Problem (“Many in Silicon Valley apparently believe that insider trading rules don’t
apply to buying or selling stakes in non-public companies like Twitter and Facebook.”); John
Carney, Insider Trading in Silicon Valley, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2011, 10:39 AM ET), http://www.cnbc.
com/id/42413987/Insider_Trading_in_Silicon_Valley (quoting a venture capitalist as asking the
author, “How can there be an insider trading issue in the Valley if everyone buying is basically
an insider?”).
219 See, e.g., Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Implements Insider-Trading Policy, WALL ST.
J. DIGITS BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010, 7:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/04/05/facebookimplements-insider-trading-policy (discussing how Facebook instituted an insider trading policy
in 2010, while still a private company, “to better comply with insider trading laws and to protect
the interests of the company and its employees and shareholders” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Stone, supra note 83 (discussing how Facebook, while still a private company,
fired an employee for violating the company’s policy against trading in company stock). Legal
implications aside, a company might seek to reduce the likelihood of insider trading in order to
protect against the reputational injury that might result if insider trading by corporate managers
or employees were to come to light. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of
Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 78 (2001) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/ abstract_id=261277 (discussing possible reputational injury to corporations from
insider trading by corporate managers).
220 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 28-29.
221 See supra note 191.
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Alternatively, if the company is not willing to make disclosures and the
shareholder is not selling pursuant to an established trading window, the
party possessing the material nonpublic information might try to obtain a
“big boy letter” in connection with the sale.222 A big boy letter is an
“agreement . . . between parties to a securities transaction where one party,
typically the seller, has material nonpublic information that it does not want
to disclose, but both parties want to complete the transaction and preclude
any claims based on the nondisclosure.”223 The letter typically includes a list
of representations and a waiver of claims, essentially stating that the party is
a “big boy” who elects to proceed with a transaction, even knowing the risks
of doing so.
But while a big boy letter might discourage or provide defenses in private actions, it is not clear that such a letter would protect against government enforcement of insider trading laws. After all, the SEC is not a party
to big boy letters. Moreover, the government could potentially show that a
defendant deceived the source of the material nonpublic information by not
disclosing his trading activities to the source, or that he deceived the
counterparty by not disclosing the specific nature and scope of the
information.224 Indeed, SEC officials have suggested unofficially that big boy
letters would not provide a defense to insider trading charges.225 In addition,
the SEC has recently shown particular concern about insider trading by
hedge funds, firms that frequently transact using big boy letters.226

222 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 31 (recommending, with reservations, the use of big
boy letters to “provide disclosure to the [outside party] and [acknowledge] the dynamics that exist
between the sophisticated buyer and seller transacting on an arm’s length basis”).
223 Edwin D. Eshmoili, Note, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside Information, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 133, 135 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18 INSIDER
TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3:19 (2012) (explaining that big boy
letters “state that the buyer of securities is not relying on any information provided or not
provided by the seller”).
224 See Goodwin Procter Memo, supra note 200, at 6-7 (discussing how big boy letters “do
not eliminate the risk of insider trading liability” and noting that “SEC officials have said that big
boy letters will not affect SEC enforcement proceedings”).
225 Eshmoili, supra note 223, at 156; see also, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, SEC v. Barclays Bank
PLC, No. 07-04427 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (describing insider trading charges against the bank
and a proprietary trader despite the use of big boy letters to advise counterparties about possession
of material nonpublic information); Rachel McTague, ‘Big Boy’ Letter Not a Defense to SEC Insider
Trading Charge, Official Says, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 3, 2007).
226 See Jenny Anderson, Side Deals in a Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at C1 (discussing an SEC case involving big boy letters and a hedge fund); SEC Staff Considers Use of ‘Big
Boy’ Letters, Bingham McCutchen ( Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing the SEC’s
“renewed interest” in insider trading cases involving big boy letters).
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In sum, Rule 10b-5 is phrased broadly; its language covers private company stock and there are limited ways for participants in secondary markets
to try to avoid or minimize insider trading. SecondMarket and SharesPost
may require the parties to represent that they are not trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information, but such representations may in actuality
do little to prevent insider trading. Accordingly, the question arises as to
how the government might or should respond—a question the next Part
endeavors to answer.
IV. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO INFORMATION ISSUES IN THE
SECONDARY MARKETS FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK
The previous Parts have built on existing literature recognizing the potentially beneficial role of the secondary markets for private stock, while
drawing new attention to significant information issues in these markets.
The secondary markets are still relatively new, and their future is unclear.
Thus, the practical challenge going forward is determining whether these
markets should be embraced, whether adequate responses to the information issues can be devised, and, more broadly, whether the markets can
be regulated in a way consistent with the SEC’s mandate to promote
investor protection, capital formation, and market integrity. This Part
explores potential responses to the information issues.
A. Lack of Information, Asymmetric Information, and Conflicts of Interest
Virtually no legal scholarship has offered a response to the information
issues that threaten the legitimacy and efficiency of these markets. Popular
media commentary addressing the issue has varied primarily between two
polar viewpoints. Some observers have argued that the markets should be
allowed to flourish unfettered since accredited investors are either sophisticated or wealthy enough to withstand a loss.227 Conversely, others have
expressed strong reservations about the surging, perhaps bubble-like, and
potentially inaccurate valuations of some companies on these markets,
suggesting that these markets should be subject to more regulatory oversight.228
227 See, e.g., Sarah Lacy, Back Off SEC: Let’s Put the “Risk” of Secondary Markets in Perspective,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 29, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/29/back-off-sec-lets-put-the-riskof-secondary-markets-in-perspective (arguing that, since trading is restricted to accredited investors,
the SEC should “stay out of the system until companies start crossing clear lines”).
228 See, e.g., Liz Gannes, Does the LinkedIn IPO Validate Secondary Market Trading?, ALLTHINGSD (May 19, 2011, 1:00 AM PST), http://allthingsd.com/20110519/does-the-linkedin-ipovalidate-secondary-market-trading (lamenting that secondary market investors “must make stock
buys based on hype and expectations”); Jeff Macke, Avoid Social Media Frenzy on Secondary
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This Article argues for a middle path. The Supreme Court established
more than a half-century ago that sophisticated investors do not need the
same protections as the unsophisticated.229 With access to information,
sophisticated investors are presumably able to “fend for themselves.”230
That is, they are assumed to be in a position to get the information they
need before investing or, alternatively, to take any lack of information into
consideration in pricing stock.231 As only accredited investors and QIBs can
buy private company stock on the secondary markets, there is arguably no
need to expand regulation of secondary trading of private company stock.
Yet, as Section III.A explained, investors on these private secondary
markets may not have the appropriate type and amount of information, and
access to this information may be difficult to obtain, particularly as investors
are not in privity with the company in a secondary transaction. Given that
the relevant regulatory structure was devised years before the rise of these
new private secondary markets, some regulatory tweaking may be necessary
to strengthen the markets and promote investor protection.
This Article proposes two reforms to this end: a specified minimum
level of disclosure for private secondary trading to fit within a registration
exemption and a reevaluation of the accredited investor standard.
One way to address the lack of information and the asymmetric information in the secondary markets would be for the SEC to require a certain
minimum level of disclosure in order for private company stock to be traded
in secondary transactions. The SEC could issue new rules or interpretive
guidance that specified certain disclosures required for secondary transactions to fit within the established securities exemptions. For instance, the
SEC could amend Rule 144 such that both affiliates and nonaffiliates would
be subject to information requirements.
The information required could include basic information critical to
evaluating a company’s financial fundamentals and stock value. The
disclosure required under Rule 701 of the Securities Act could serve as a

Markets, YAHOO FIN. ( June 7, 2011, 11:58 AM EDT), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/
avoid-social-media-frenzy-secondary-markets-macke-155809254.html (arguing that the SEC should
regulate secondary markets because outsiders will “lose big” due to the limited information about
private companies and the likelihood of insider trading in these markets).
229 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (declaring that transactions should
be exempt from the Securities Act if “there is no practical need for [the Act’s] application” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
230 Id.
231 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.3 (1986) (“Institutional investors are
usually sophisticated and powerful enough to demand and get the information they need . . . .”).
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useful reference point.232 Rule 701 provides a registration exemption for
compensatory stock options, and requires private companies issuing over $5
million in stock options within a twelve-month period to provide optionholders with risk information and financial statements no more than 180
days old.233 The SEC could also consider, by contrast, less and more
stringent reference points—such as the Rule 144 exemption for affiliates
selling restricted stock, and the full registration requirements or the JOBS
Act on-ramp for newly public companies.234 In addition to considering
these reference points, the SEC should seek public comment and engage in
cost-benefit analysis to require disclosures properly tailored to the private
secondary market context.235
The goal would not be to replicate the extensive governance and reporting requirements of public companies, but rather to standardize a modest
level of required information that would not overly burden the private
companies and that sophisticated investors would find critical for basic
valuation.236 In other words, the disclosure requirement is meant to address
the concern that there is not enough information available to make prudent
232 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e) (2012) (listing required disclosures). Exchange Act Rule 12h-1
provided a similar registration exemption under the Exchange Act; the JOBS Act extended this
relief by excluding from the Section 12(g) definition of record holders any persons who received
securities pursuant to an employee compensation plan exempt from the Securities Act registration
requirements. See supra note 73.
233 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3
SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 3:38 n.19 (2005) (further specifying the financial
statements required to be disclosed). Companies may make the disclosures on a passwordprotected Internet site and are permitted to condition disclosure on the optionholder’s agreement to
maintain the confidentiality of the agreement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1 (f)(1)(vi) & (note); Exemption
of Compensatory Employee Stock Options from Registration Under Section 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56887, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,554 (Dec. 7, 2007).
234 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; supra note 41; supra note 57 and accompanying
text. Rule 144 requires disclosure of current information about the issuer, principally the
company’s most recent balance sheet, profit and loss statement, and retained earnings statement
for the last and preceding fiscal years. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(c)(2) & 240.15c2-11(a)(5). There is no
requirement that the information be audited, and the standard for “reasonably current” information under Rule 144(c)(2) is relatively lax. See Michael K. Molitor, Will More Sunlight Fade the
Pink Sheets? Increasing Public Information About Non-Reporting Issuers with Quoted Securities, 39 IND.
L. REV. 309, 335-38 (2006) (discussing the low information and timeliness standards under Rule
15c2-11, incorporated by Rule 144(c)).
235 For a discussion of the difficulties of doing cost-benefit analysis, and its role in SEC
policymaking, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/ abstract_id=1984686.
236 See id. (manuscript at 31) (“[A] disclosure regime makes sense, though we have to balance
this benefit against the risk that government-mandated disclosure will turn out not to be costefficient.”).
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decisions, regardless of an investor’s accredited status.237 As one managing
director of an investment firm said, “It’s hard enough to get information on
Facebook. I’m an accredited [investor], I have an M.B.A. in finance, how do
I know what these things should be valued at?”238 A moderate mandatory
disclosure rule could correct for a market failure in information production
and thereby strengthen these markets.239
As this requirement could be structured as specific guidance for fitting
any given transaction within an exemption, the information would not have
to be disclosed to the public at large, but rather only to the secondary
transaction participants. Such a requirement would allow companies to
continue to use secure electronic data rooms and confidentiality agreements
to maintain some level of control and confidentiality. Mature private
companies whose stock is likely to be traded on secondary markets may
have already prepared the same type of information for compliance with the
disclosure requirements of Rule 701, and possibly for affiliate sellers who
have sold stock pursuant to Rule 144.
This idea reflects changes in the venture capital cycle—that the lengthening period of time from a company’s formation to a major liquidity event
has created mature private companies that straddle or blur the lines between
previously held notions of public and private.240 SharesPost has said that it
is “trying to create an interim market between the VC investing world and
237 See id. (manuscript at 32) (“An active trading market disconnected from [private bargaining over allocation of capital to the issuer], even among the sophisticated or wealthy, will not by
itself generate a socially optimal amount or type of information.”).
238 Rusli, supra note 95.
239 Mandatory disclosure in the public markets is premised on the idea that the optimal
amount of information will not be produced if left to normal market forces and that information is
a public good. Explanations have been framed in terms of investor protection and efficiency, and
grounded on benefits to investors and society more broadly. For an overview of mandatory
disclosure literature, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 286-314 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734-37 (1984);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REV. 669, 680-96 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369-95 (1999); Michael D.
Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 123, 186-88 (2004); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and
Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 478-85 (2007); and Joel Seligman, The Historical Need
for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 10-45 (1983). For a recent survey of
literature on financial reporting, see generally Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010).
240 See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 235 (discussing the “public-private
divide” in securities regulation).
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the public markets;”241 this proposal would establish a corresponding
interim level of disclosure. This idea might become increasingly important
as the secondary markets continue to develop and change, particularly in
times of bubble-like exuberance.242
The idea has limitations, however, and some of the concerns about information issues in these markets would likely remain. One can imagine
scenarios where, despite the availability of certain basic information, private
companies would not disclose other important information for valuing their
stock. Participants in these markets would still have to make their own
determinations of whether they had sufficient information to make investment decisions. This proposal would only set a standard minimum level of
disclosure to address a fundamental information failure.
Furthermore, while an interim level of disclosure responds to the lack of
information and asymmetric information, it does not directly address
conflicts of interest. While a certain base level of information might help
counteract biased research reports, a separate response to the conflict of
interest issue may be necessary.
In addition, there is, of course, a cost associated with requiring disclosure, however modest. Companies could be concerned that the information
disclosed would not remain confidential and might refuse to make the
required disclosures, effectively preventing shareholders from selling their
stock on the secondary markets. Such a move could decrease the liquidity of
some private company stock relative to the current situation, and constrain
the growth of these markets. Furthermore, a minimum information
mandate might require more company involvement than SharesPost
currently includes in its model. Requiring information disclosures might
necessitate moving to a model that creates controlled liquidity events rather
than one that aims for an active marketplace.
The cost could, however, be kept moderate, similar to Rule 701’s information requirements, which apply to companies issuing significant stock

241
242

Yarow, supra note 10.
For example, if the markets were to develop in such a way that higher value or more
mature firms constrained trading in their stock, but riskier, lower value firms did not, information
standards might become even more important. See Guttentag, supra note 70, (manuscript at 35)
(discussing the “lemons” problem, witnessed in European markets, which predicts negative
spillover effects in markets where firms provide only limited amounts of information); see also
Gannes, supra note 41 (noting that one well-regarded VC firm has started instructing its portfolio
companies to include a right of first refusal on all stock options so that they can buy stock back
instead of allowing outside transactions).
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options or compensatory equity awards.243 If so, many companies might
voluntarily cooperate, as evidenced by SecondMarket’s newer business
model, which is based on significant issuer involvement. While companies
may be sensitive to the number of shareholders and other concerns related
to secondary trading,244 they may also find they benefit in the long run from
the presence of vibrant secondary markets.245 Further, over time, investors
may be able to exert leverage over companies for minimal disclosures, either
because of their size or number.
A second way to address concerns about information issues is to reexamine the definition of “accredited investor,” established in Rule 501 of
Regulation D.246 This proposal does not directly deal with the amount or
quality of information available, but rather addresses the concern that there
are individuals participating in the secondary markets who cannot fend for
themselves.
The definition of “accredited investor” aims to capture investors who
are sophisticated enough to make their own trades, or who can afford to
hire advisors, and so do not need securities law protections.247 Net worth
and income serve as objective proxies for this ability to fend for oneself.248
As a result, the accredited investor definition is notoriously under- and
over-inclusive.249 It is underinclusive because financially knowledgeable
investors may not meet the minimum wealth requirements for accredited
status, and overinclusive because wealthy individuals without financial
sophistication may qualify as accredited.
Moreover, despite various narrow SEC proposals and small modifications in the Dodd-Frank Act,250 the definition has not changed substantially
243
244
245
246
247

See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-74, 200 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited
Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 683 (2008) (noting that such an investor “generally is defined in
terms of wealth, on the theory that an accredited investor can hire knowledgeable and sophisticated
advisors”); supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
249 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 279, 310-11 (2000) (noting that the term “may treat otherwise financially sophisticated
investors as nonaccredited, while treating financial neophytes as accredited”); Wallis K. Finger,
Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933
Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 748 (2009) (observing that “a financial novice” can be accredited
“based upon the accident of being rich”).
250 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) (adjusting the accredited investor standard for natural persons
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since it was promulgated in 1982,251 and the minimum net worth and income
requirements are arguably outdated.252 With inflation and growth in wealth,
many more individuals today meet the requirements than when the
guidelines were set.253
A reexamination of the definition could look at whether the objective
threshold should be raised as well as whether another component should be
added or substituted to minimize the under- and over-inclusiveness.254 The
net worth or income test may be a better proxy for sophistication and access
to information in the context of primary issuances, where the investor is in
privity with the issuer, than in secondary trading, where the investor is not
and may have more difficulty gaining access to information.255 It would thus
be worthwhile to study whether proposals for other components such as a
licensing scheme, strengthened suitability requirements on broker-dealers,
or a move to a multi-factored approach would better serve stated goals in
this secondary context.256 In short, the thresholds may be too low and too
so that the net worth requirement is $1 million, excluding the value of the investor’s primary
residence); Finger, supra note 249, at 734-36 (noting that in 2006 and 2007 the SEC proposed
alternative definitions of accredited investor). The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to
periodically review the accredited investor standard and adjust it “as the Commission may deem
appropriate for the protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.”
Dodd-Frank Act § 413(b)(1)(B).
251 Finger, supra note 249, at 743.
252 Karmel, supra note 247, at 681.
253 See SEC Proposes Liberalization of Private Placement Requirements, MORRISON FOERSTER
(Aug. 9, 2007), http://www.mofo.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=7867
(noting that, due to inflation, the percentage of American households qualifying as accredited
investors has increased from approximately 1.64% of households in 1982 to approximately 8.47% of
households).
254 See Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological
Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22
(1998) (expressing “skepticism about the self-protective abilities of seemingly sophisticated
investors” and suggesting a careful empirical study of investment decisionmaking of investors in
private securities offerings, including “solid demographic work, as well as inquiry into the process
and influences on purchase decisions”).
255 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 235, at 30-31 (“‘Fending for oneself’ is easier
when the investor is in privity or near-privity with the issuer, because representations and
warranties can be extracted fairly directly; in aftermarket trading, by contrast, the link between
issuer and investor is broken.”).
256 See Choi, supra note 249, at 284 (re-imagining the federal securities law regime to classify
investors into four groups based on their knowledge and resources, using a licensing system);
Fletcher, supra note 42, at 1149-54 (suggesting a multi-factored approach to decide whether an
investor is sophisticated, using investor-specific information); Finger, supra note 249, at 759-62
(criticizing the accredited investor definition and proposing a licensing scheme to supplement the
current definition); Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The
Lacunae in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 313-14 (1994) (expressing
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imprecise to ensure that investors can fend for themselves in secondary
markets for private company stock, where the protections of the public
markets are not present.
Providing guidance or modest regulatory reform on information disclosure and the accredited investor thresholds will serve investor protection
and market integrity goals, and in turn allow the secondary markets to grow
and evolve.
B. Insider Trading
Increasing the minimum information disclosed, as suggested above,
might help reduce information asymmetries in the secondary markets, and
in turn might reduce insider trading. Yet, as the proposal does not recommend the disclosure of all material information, there is no reason to believe
that setting a minimum level of information disclosure would eliminate
insider trading. Traders could still possess nonpublic, material information
and be in a position to benefit by trading on that information, in breach of a
fiduciary duty or relationship of trust or confidence. Thus, even with the
proposed information requirement, concerns about insider trading in the
private secondary markets would remain.
A scholarly debate about whether insider trading should be regulated at
all has raged for over half a century.257 Critics of insider trading regulation
have argued that insider trading increases share price efficiency, causes no
harm to other traders, is an efficient compensation scheme for managers,
and mitigates agency costs.258 Supporters of insider trading regulation have
argued that insider trading is unfair, does not contribute significantly to price
efficiency, may reduce investor confidence in securities markets, increases
transaction costs and decreases market liquidity by increasing bid-ask
spreads, constitutes a misappropriation of information and wealth better
assigned to the corporation, and creates perverse incentives for manageconcerns about the treatment of wealthy, unsophisticated, accredited investors, and proposing “a
more meaningful suitability requirement”).
257 For the seminal work that sparked this debate, see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
258 For literature describing the various arguments for why insider trading should not be
regulated, see MACEY, supra note 142, and MANNE, supra note 257. Cf. Dennis W. Carlton &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 (1983)
(“[C]ommunicating information through insider trading may be of value to the firm.”); Michael
P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1980) (noting that
insider trading regulations, if they are to be justified, cannot be justified on the basis of protecting
consumers since they typically do not).
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ment.259 Policy prescriptions have run the gamut from proposals that
insider trading be fully legalized260 or partially legalized261 to claims that it
should be more aggressively tracked and punished.262 Despite extensive
literature and a multitude of empirical studies, scholars have not reached a
conclusive resolution in the debate.263 As a practical matter, however, the
SEC and the courts have long enforced the insider trading prohibition, and
so this Section starts from that premise. This Section does not seek to
rehash the debate about insider trading generally, but rather focuses on
potential responses in the specific context of the private secondary markets.
The SEC is in the unfortunate position of choosing between imperfect
paths of action regarding insider trading in private company stocks. Each of
the three options outlined below comes with some drawbacks. The choice is
particularly difficult as pertinent empirical questions, such as how much
insider trading is actually taking place in the secondary markets and to what
extent market participants are aware of the level of insider trading, remain
unanswered.
One option for the SEC is proactively to enforce existing insider trading laws in the secondary markets. The SEC could take a two-pronged
approach by issuing guidance, similar to its approach on insider trading
policies and big boy letters, as well as launching investigations into specific
transactions. Doing so would draw attention to the applicability of insider
trading laws to private company stock and put investors on notice. It would
259 For literature describing the various arguments why insider trading should be regulated,
see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 762 (3d ed.
1995); Brudney, supra note 205, at 327-28; Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 330-33; Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and
Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1, 17-46 (1993); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 630-32 (1984);
Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051-53 (1982); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 119; Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68
VA. L. REV. 117, 122 (1982); and Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 817-18 (1980).
260 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did
Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005).
261 See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric Insider
Trading Regime, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1096-98 (2006) (suggesting that price-decreasing
insider trading should be allowed but not price-enhancing insider trading).
262 See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 209, at 379 (asserting that insider trading laws support ideals
of fairness, protect corporations’ property, and aid economic efficiency).
263 Stephen Clark, Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go From Here?, 16
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 57 (2010).
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also give the SEC the opportunity to provide helpful clarification as to
proper practices for private companies opening trading windows, and would
be in line with the SEC’s revived interest in insider trading generally.264
Further, recent empirical work suggests that insider trading enforcement is
associated with increased liquidity and lower cost of equity.265
As a practical matter, though, it may be difficult to police insider trading
in private company stock. Illegal insider trading is generally quite difficult to
prove—traders can hide behind proxies, it can be hard to determine what the
trader knew at the time of the trade, and direct evidence is rare.266 Indeed,
the SEC itself has acknowledged this difficulty.267 And it may be even more
challenging for the government to detect insider trading in the private
company stock context because stock prices and trading information are not
publicly available and no baseline of publicly reported information exists.
Moreover, an aggressive approach has the potential to squash the online
secondary markets while they are still in a delicate initial stage. Many
shareholders might have access to material nonpublic information, or seem
as though they might,268 and, after seeing an insider trading case in the
headlines, might not be willing to sell due to fears of investigation or
liability. With increased attention on insider trading in these markets,
outsiders may fixate on—or overestimate—the risk of buying from insiders269

264 The government has recently brought novel insider trading charges in a variety of cases,
including its prosecution of one of the biggest insider trading cases in history. See Prentice, supra
note 209, at 344 & n.1 (describing recent insider trading cases involving instruments such as credit
default swaps, new theories such as under 18 U.S.C § 1348, and defendants such as employers,
famous billionaires, and administrative assistants).
265 See Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An
Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 240, 273-80
(2007) (finding that “countries with more stringent insider trading laws have more dispersed
equity ownership; more liquid stock markets; and more informative stock prices”); Utpal
Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 104 (2002)
(“[E]nforcement of insider trading laws . . . is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity in a
country.”). But see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 144-49 (2004) (questioning the causal link between regulation and market liquidity).
266 Clark, supra note 263, at 47-48.
267 See id. at 64 n.130 (quoting testimony of an SEC director that insider trading cases “are
unquestionably among the most difficult cases we are called upon to prove, and despite careful and
time-consuming investigations, we may not be able to establish all of the facts necessary to
support an insider trading charge”).
268 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
269 Cf. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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and subsequently lose confidence in the secondary markets. In turn, that
lost confidence could decrease liquidity and increase the cost of capital.270
Responses are difficult to predict, however, as arguably outsiders might have
increased confidence in the markets upon seeing government oversight.271
Another option is for the SEC to do nothing—to take a wait-and-see
approach, without taking significant actions to investigate insider trading or
issue guidance. This approach may be a sensible one for now, as the markets
are still developing, and over time their role and size will become clearer.
And in the meantime, to the extent that insider trading allows information
to be impounded in the price of securities, insider trading in these markets
might be increasing pricing efficiency.272 Corporate insiders tend to have
the best information about the company’s financial health and prospects,
and when they buy or sell their company’s stock “they convey valuable
information to the marketplace.”273 Improved pricing efficiency may also
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.274
But this do nothing or wait-and-see approach also has its drawbacks.
Participants would continue to face uncertainty about SEC views if it did
not act or issue guidance. In addition, the SEC could face mounting
political pressure to regulate. It could face harsh criticism if egregious
examples of insider trading were to come to light amid lax enforcement.
Further, supporters of an insider trading prohibition might worry that the
incidence of insider trading in private company stock would increase as
insiders discovered they could get away with it. And if outsiders perceived
an unchecked insider trading problem, they might refuse to participate or
excessively discount prices.275 As previously noted, however, it is difficult to
270 For a discussion of how liquidity may affect the cost of equity, see, for example,
MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY (1995); Yakov Amihud & Haim
Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 246 (1986); and Michael J.
Brennan & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: On the Compensation
for Illiquidity in Stock Returns, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 441, 459 (1996).
271 See Clark, supra note 263, at 58 (considering the argument that outsiders would lose
confidence in a market where insiders can use material nonpublic information to make abnormal
profits in trades with outsiders).
272 See Manne, supra note 260, at 169 (“[T]he argument for a strong positive relationship
between market efficiency and insider trading has proved to be very robust.”). But see Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 259, at 632 (arguing that it would aid efficiency if insiders were required to
disclose their identity and the size of their trade before trading).
273 Lambert, supra note 261, at 1054.
274 Id.
275 See, e.g., Macke, supra note 228 (calling buyers of private company stock in secondary
markets “the quintessential suckers at the poker table, regardless of whether they make the couple
hundred thousand a year needed to qualify as accredited”).
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predict whether government pursuit of insider trading cases in the secondary markets would encourage or discourage participation.276
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, Congress or the SEC could
affirmatively create a safe harbor from the insider trading prohibition for
secondary trading of private company stocks. To the extent that insider
trading is difficult to avoid in the context of private company stock, a safe
harbor would provide valuable clarity and latitude. Such a move would
make sense if the SEC were to determine that the benefits of the secondary
private markets outweighed the value or importance of enforcing insider
trading laws in this area. The safe harbor might also serve as a useful
experiment for testing the frequently made argument in favor of deregulation—essentially, that corporations should (and will) set their own insider
trading policies by contract.277 Further, as buyers in the secondary markets
must be either QIBs or accredited investors, one could argue in favor of
treating insider trading differently in these markets than in public markets.
In theory, participants in the private secondary markets should have the
sophistication to understand the risks they face and to address them by
inquiring into their counterparties’ information, requiring a representation
that they are not trading on inside information, or adjusting the price at
which they are willing to trade.278 Participants should also have the financial
capability to withstand losing money on an investment.
Like the other options, this safe harbor approach also has its downsides.
As with the do nothing or wait-and-see approach, it is possible that a safe
harbor for insider trading in the private secondary markets may lead
outsiders to refuse to participate or to discount prices excessively, which
could have deleterious effects on the private secondary markets. Further, if
one believes that insider trading should be prohibited in general, the
reasoning applies with equal force in the private context. Finally, despite
arguments about the sophistication of investors in the private secondary
markets, the SEC may have concerns about adopting an inconsistent policy
across markets.
While there is a relatively clean slate in choosing between these options,
one might make the uneasy case for the first approach of enforcement and
276
277

See supra text accompanying note 271.
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 258, at 863 (applying the Coase theorem to insider
trading and arguing that private ordering will result in optimal allocation of property rights in
information); see also David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading,
80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986) (expanding application of the Coase theorem to insider trading).
278 See Scott, supra note 259, at 807-09 (noting that if insider trading is known, outsiders will
not be disadvantaged because the price they pay will reflect the risk of insider trading).
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guidance by observing that the arguments in favor of insider trading
regulation in the public company context are at least as strong and perhaps
stronger in the private marketplace. Since the SEC actively enforces insider
trading in public markets, it seems to follow that it would do so in the
private context.
To start, while the argument that insider trading contributes to share
price efficiency279 maintains its strength in the private company stock
context, the other key anti-regulation argument—that insider trading causes
no harm—arguably does not.280 The argument that insider trading causes no
harm is premised on a liquid, impersonal market. It posits “that no real
damage is caused to an investor who engages anonymously on an exchange
in a trade with an insider on the other side of the transaction”281 because
“the seller has made an independent decision to sell without knowing that
the insider is buying; if the insider were not buying, the seller would still
sell.”282 The new secondary markets for private company stock are not
liquid and impersonal like public markets, however. These markets are
thinly traded, and at times posted offers to buy or sell go unmatched.283
Thus, in some instances, if the insider did not buy or sell, the transaction
would not otherwise occur. Further, trades in the private market are
customized transactions between two identifiable parties.284 Thus, insider
trading may indeed harm individual investors in the private company stock
context.

279 For counterarguments that insider trading causes efficiency losses, see Lambert, supra
note 261, at 1050-51.
280 In his seminal work, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Henry Manne actually made
three arguments against regulating insider trading, but he has since largely discounted one of
them, and thus this Article does not address it. See Manne, supra note 260, at 170-71 (“My second
‘positive’ argument for insider trading, that it could perform well as a part of an executive
compensation package, has been the more forcefully attacked, and it is perhaps less robust than I
and other proponents had originally assumed.” (footnotes omitted)).
281 Manne, supra note 260, at 168.
282 Bainbridge, supra note 219, at 72.
283 See generally Yarow, supra note 10 (quoting the SharesPost CEO commenting on the
varying levels of activity in the private marketplace).
284 See supra Section I.B. Uninformed outsiders can be expected to systematically lose in
trades with insiders. See Lee, supra note 259 at 160-61 (“Since insiders will only buy when stock is
undervalued and sell when stock is overvalued, outside investors who trade simultaneously with
and in the opposite direction from insiders will always be buying when the price is too high or selling
when the price is too low.”); see also Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Mar.–Apr. 1971, at 12, 13 (showing that market makers always lose to informed traders).
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Furthermore, the arguments against insider trading maintain their
weight in the private stock context. For example, despite scholarly criticism,285
unfairness has been one of the primary rationales for prohibiting insider
trading.286 There is no reason to believe concerns about fairness would be
different in the private secondary market context. Observers have asserted
that the unfairness in insider trading stems from insiders’ unequal access to
information, their ability to act against their principals’ interests for their
own personal profit, and their ability to profit in a way that is not correlated
with any value created for their firms.287 These perceived sources of
unfairness apply equally well to insiders trading in private company or
public company stocks.
Another argument for imposing insider trading liability which also
maintains its strength in the private company context is that the prohibition
protects corporations’ property interests in information. In brief, a rule
allowing insider trading assigns a property interest in the nonpublic
information to the insider, whereas a rule prohibiting insider trading assigns
it to the corporation. The property-based approach maintains that assigning
the right to the corporation is better because it “protect[s] the economic
incentive to produce socially valuable information.”288 Notably, allowing
insider trading in private company stock would still effectively assign a
property right to corporate information to insiders—and there still would
not be a good reason for doing so.
In sum, the SEC has a difficult path to navigate in deciding how to handle insider trading in private company stock. All of the SEC’s options—to
285 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 260, at 182 n.60 (criticizing fairness arguments against insider
trading as “puerile”); Bainbridge, supra note 219, at 71 (arguing that we cannot articulate a
definition of fairness that sufficiently justifies the insider trading prohibition and that most
definitions of fairness “collapse into . . . efficiency-based rationales”).
286 E.g., Prentice, supra note 209, at 380-81; see also, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Essay, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (2003) (“Although academics still debate the economic desirability of
insider trading, the consensus among the American public, Congress, and the SEC is that insider
trading is ‘unfair’ and erodes investor confidence in the market.”); James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and
the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 362 n.82 (2010) (noting that it may be
unjust to allow insiders to take advantage of informational asymmetry because the insider has
obtained information specifically by virtue of his position rather than by deliberately acquiring
information (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1978))).
287 See Prentice, supra note 209, at 379-83 (summarizing fairness arguments).
288 Bainbridge, supra note 219, at 78-79. In addition, the case for assigning the right to insiders is arguably weak because insider trading is “an inefficient compensation scheme.” Id. at 80; see
also Manne, supra note 260, at 170-71 n.14 (acknowledging weaknesses in the argument for viewing
insider trading as executive compensation).
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enforce insider trading laws proactively, to do nothing, or to create a safe
harbor—come with pros and cons. This Section takes as a given the current
regime and observes that the argument for enforcing insider trading liability
remains at least as strong in the private market context as in the public, and
is perhaps stronger because arguably insider trading causes harm on these
less liquid, more personal markets. This observation is made with some
caution, however, as enforcing insider trading laws in private company stock
has to date been relatively rare. Likewise, empirical facts such as how often
insider trading occurs in these markets and its effect on the markets are
unknown.
V. THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MARKETS
The previous Parts have examined the secondary markets for private
company stock, information issues in these markets, and potential responses
to these concerns. This Part seeks to tie this examination to broader policy
questions and provide some preliminary observations.
In short, fostering the growth of private markets implicates an underlying tension with public markets and the policy rationales that undergird the
divide between public and private companies. The new secondary markets
have the potential to play an important role in the private company
ecosystem, but their growth might also pose a threat to public markets or to
the values that we aim to further by maintaining and regulating them.289
A robust secondary market can play the beneficial role, discussed in Part
II, of increasing liquidity in private company stock. This liquidity may be
useful to the venture capital industry, which supports innovation and
growth companies that provide a host of economic and technological
benefits to society. The potential for liquidity may also help start-up
companies with their fundraising, and it may bolster their ability to use
stock options to recruit and retain employees.
The flip side, however, is that a robust secondary market might lead
companies to choose to stay private longer or to avoid the public realm
altogether.290 The need for liquidity has been a key reason for companies to
289 See Langevoort, supra note 254, at 11 (identifying as an issue “whether the [SEC] is willing to permit the kind of threat to the role of the organized exchanges that a deep and liquid
market for private securities would pose”).
290 See Ronald D. Orol, SEC Hints at Easing of Rules for Non-Public Trades, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (May 10, 2011), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-05-10/economy/30731548_
1_secondmarket-private-shares-offering-rules (citing Professor John Coffee as arguing that private
companies would continue to avoid going public if possible and that relaxing the rules for trading
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go public; if secondary markets can increase the liquidity of private company
stock, that incentive loses much of its force.291
Indeed, the secondary markets explicitly aim to help companies stay
private. The CEO of SharesPost explained:
Two of the biggest reasons to go public are to get liquidity for your existing
shareholders and to gain efficient access to growth capital. We’ve stepped
back and said, “Can we provide those two solutions for these companies?”
And if so, give the companies the opportunity to go public over their time
frame as opposed to “I’ve got a gun to my head.” Now the companies have
much more control over the process and timing of if and when they do a
public listing.292

Similarly, the CEO of SecondMarket commented:
[T]he public markets [are] permanently broken. And I think there’s an
opportunity here to create an entirely new exchange, an entirely new marketplace that’s good for companies . . . I think over time what you’re going
to see is more and more companies choosing to stay private and choosing to
be a part of the new market structure that we’ve created.293

Further, SecondMarket was an “early and forceful advocate[]”294 for the
JOBS Act reforms, which significantly raised the record-holder threshold
for going public and eliminated the prohibition against “general solicitation” in private offerings.295 These reforms could help companies stay

private company stock “would hurt transparency, make the market less efficient and increase
fraud”).
291 Cf. Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 661-63 (2008) (“[O]ne of the primary benefits of going public is that it permits
insiders to cash out of the business . . . [and] permits a company to use equity as compensation.”);
Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 641 (“Going public offers a company a number of advantages, including
enhanced reputation, establishment of a market value for the company, and a broadened
ownership base. For many companies, however, the primary advantages of going public are
securing a large infusion of equity capital and attaining share liquidity.” (footnote omitted)).
292 Yarow, supra note 10.
293 Silbert, supra note 84, at 22:22–23:54; see also Ben Popper, Forget Facebook, the IPO Market
Is Dying, Says SecondMarket CEO Barry Silbert, VENTUREBEAT ( Jan. 17, 2012, 8:40 AM), http://
venturebeat.com/2012/01/17/secondmarket-facebook-ipo-private-shares-barry-silbert (quoting SecondMarket CEO Barry Silbert as saying, “We want to create a market where anyone who is a 20
percent holder of a company with a valuation of $150 million or more can get liquidity on their
investment within two years”).
294 Q1 2012 Business Update, SECONDMARKET (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.secondmarket.
com/discover/reports/q1-2012-business-update.
295 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 201 & 501, 126 Stat. 306, 313, 325 (2012).
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private longer, and, as SecondMarket and SharesPost branch out to
facilitating private placements,296 could allow for more aggressive marketing
in the private capital raising process.297
It is no wonder that the secondary markets aim to help companies stay
private, as the secondary markets may benefit when companies do so.298 The
online markets are private companies themselves and receive fees for
transactions.299 The greater the trading activity through their sites, the more
money they make. Mature private company stock has been the most
actively traded on the sites, and the sites suffer a blow when companies such
as Facebook go public.300
However, from a policy perspective, there may be considerable downsides to robust private secondary markets that parallel public markets.
Federal securities laws mandate registration, designed to protect investors
and ensure confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.301 Expanding
exemptions and loosening strictures on sales of restricted stock increases the
scope of securities issued and traded without the safeguard of registration.302
The venture capital model uses a portfolio strategy that recognizes that
many businesses will fail,303 but individual buyers might not sufficiently
296 See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Spears, supra note 89 (“SecondMarket . . .
plans to raise money from its clients for at least eight different investment funds, run by outside
managers . . . .”). The JOBS Act also raised the offering limits under Regulation A from $5 million
to $50 million and created a new exemption under the Securities Act for a type of capital raising
known as “crowdfunding,” which uses the Internet to pool small individual contributions. JOBS
Act §§ 301–402.
297 See, e.g., Spears, supra note 89 (noting that the elimination of the general solicitation ban
“eas[es] the way for both SecondMarket and SharesPost to jump into that business”). Note that all
actual purchasers of the securities must still be by accredited investors or QIBs. JOBS Act § 201.
298 See, e.g., J.J. Colao, Breaking Down the JOBS Act: Inside the Bill That Would Transform
American Business, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/
03/21/jobs-act (“Private secondary market companies like SecondMarket and SharesPost would
benefit substantially from this reform [raising the shareholder cap to 2000], as it would likely lead
to a larger, more robust market for the shares of private companies.”); Spears, supra note 89 (“The
JOBS Act may also broaden the universe of stocks available for trading on these platforms. It
allows companies to amass more shareholders while staying private.”).
299 See supra Section I.B.
300 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
301 See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a
Robust Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 757-59 (2009) (describing the SEC’s
objectives in requiring securities registration).
302 Id. at 753.
303 See BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 4, 8 (describing the typical venture investing strategy as “swinging for the fences,” with investments that are either “home runs or strike
outs,” and noting that, in the last decade, venture capital dollars went into over 30,000 financing
rounds for companies that never had a successful traditional exit).
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diversify or understand the risks of investing in private companies.304
Further, the information that is available may give investors a false sense of
security about the risks of investing and the accuracy of pricing.
And even if there is little concern for protecting accredited investors,
there is reason to believe that private secondary market activity may affect
retail investors. The Facebook IPO provides an example of how these two
types of investors may be connected. According to its prospectus, Facebook
relied on the market transaction method and “recent private stock sale
transactions” as factors in determining its offering price valuation.305 In
addition, its amended prospectus noted that a revision in its anticipated
IPO price was influenced by “third-party private stock sale transactions in
January 2012.”306 Thus the initial public offering price was set with reference to the share price on the secondary markets. Retail investors accounted
for a significant amount of the stock bought in Facebook’s IPO.307
Even apart from the investor protection aspect of registration, many
securities laws that apply to public companies, such as Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank, are actually corporate governance laws as well. Companies
that choose to stay private avoid not only registration, but also the reach of
304 In addition, smaller companies present a disproportionate risk of failure and fraud. See
Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 58 (1998) (“[R]egulators have identified small businesses as some of the
riskiest investment opportunities.”). But cf. supra note 204.
305 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 63 (Feb. 1, 2012). The secondary
markets may be encouraging reliance on their pricing data. SharesPost has made “real-time”
pricing data for US-based private companies available on Bloomberg terminals. Press Release,
Sharespost, SharesPost Data on Private Companies Now Included on Bloomberg Terminals (Nov.
9, 2011), available at https://www.sharespost.com/bloomberg.
306 Facebook, Inc., Amendment No. 8 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 78
(May 16, 2012); see also Shelly Palmer, Facebook’s IPO: A View From The West, SYS-CON MEDIA
(May 23, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://www.sys-con.com/node/2282015/ (“[T]he private market already
signaled pricing to the public markets well in advance of the IPO so the banks had very little
flexibility with pricing without facing sharp questions from either the company or the investors.”);
Felix Salmon, Facebook’s SecondMarket Muppets, REUTERS (May 30, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://
blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/05/30/facebooks-secondmarket-muppets (“[B]asic economic
theory suggests that if a stock has buyers at $44 privately, then its public value will be higher than
that, since the universe of potential buyers expands enormously. Given that theory, it would have
been really hard, I think, for Morgan Stanley to price the IPO below the levels seen on SecondMarket for most of the previous year . . . .”).
307 See Jean Eaglesham & Telis Demos, Lawmakers Push for Overhaul of IPO Process, WALL
ST. J., June 21, 2012, at A1 (“Morgan Stanley [] allocated to retail investors 26% of shares, much
higher than the 15% allocation in a typical IPO.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Facebook Gold Rush:
Fanfare vs. Realities, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, at BU5 (“Indications are that Facebook was bought
primarily by individual investors, not institutions. Indeed, institutions that had invested early
were big sellers in the I.P.O.”).
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many corporate governance provisions. Moreover, a host of other laws, such
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),308 impose burdens on public
companies not directly relating to disclosure or governance. Scholars have
begun to explore ways of reconceiving the “publicness” of corporations that
capture the dimensions beyond public reporting.309 The JOBS Act’s onramp provisions have also recently provided a glimpse into how public
reporting obligations might be unbundled from governance and other
obligations.310 These developments demonstrate the need to grapple more
fully and systematically with questions such as what additional burdens
should be placed on different types of companies and whether line drawing
should be done with reference to whether or not a company’s stock trades
on a public market.
Finally, a separate concern surrounding the growth of the secondary
markets for private company stock is that some perceive it as creating an
exclusive private stock market for the wealthy. In this vein, finance writer
Felix Salmon proclaimed, “To invest in younger, smaller companies, you
increasingly need to be a member of the ultra-rich elite.”311 Small investors
are shut out from directly investing in these growth companies.312 And
308 The FCPA prohibits bribery of a foreign official, party, or candidate to assist in obtaining
or retaining business or securing any improper advantage, and requires that public companies keep
accurate records of transactions and payments and maintain a system of internal controls. 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
309 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 235, at 43 (exploring the public–private
company divide and arguing that “a distinct class of systemically significant public issuers” should
be created that enjoys a different level of regulation than other issuers); Hillary A. Sale, The New
“Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 139-40 (2011) (arguing that the definition
of a corporation as public by reference to whether it trades on a public market is “impoverished”
and that “the government and the media have increasing influence over public corporations and
their governance”).
310 The JOBS Act on-ramp provides that a list of Exchange Act obligations otherwise imposed on public companies will not apply until five years after a company’s IPO, unless the
company either passes $1 billion in annual revenues or reaches a certain market capitalization.
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–108, 126 Stat. 306, 307-13 (2012); see also supra note 41.
311 Salmon, supra note 23; see also Felix Salmon, The Downside of Companies Staying Private,
REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/03/22/the-downside-ofcompanies-staying-private (arguing that limiting investment in private companies creates “a world
where most companies are owned by a small group of global plutocrats, living off the labor of the
rest of us”); The Endangered Public Company: Rival Versions of Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 19,
2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21555562 (“[P]ublic companies give ordinary
people a chance to invest directly in capitalism’s most important wealth-creating machines . . .
The rise of private equity and the spread of private markets are returning power to a club of
privileged investors.”).
312 The Facebook IPO provides an interesting example of the media drawing attention to the
idea that certain wealthy investors and institutions have the opportunity for large gains before the
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despite the fact that pre-IPO investments are not guaranteed to make
money, many commentators have predicted that the secondary markets will
nonetheless continue to exist because “investors have little choice but to
tread into the private markets if they want to invest in the rapid-growth
stages of new tech companies.”313 Apart from indirect investments,314
however, unaccredited retail investors cannot tread into these private
markets.
This concern about a stratified market structure is, of course, in tension
with the investor protection goals that are served by limiting access to the
private markets in the first place.315 As such, it perhaps serves as a useful
stock is available to the public. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Did Hedge Funds Steal the Facebook IPO
Pop?, FORBES (May 21, 2012, 2:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/05/21/didhedge-funds-steal-the-facebook-ipo-pop (noting that VCs are selling late-stage private company
stock to hedge funds, private equity firms, and wealthy investors and that the IPO “pop” is a
“casualty” of companies taking longer to go public); Daniel Gross, Facebook’s IPO Already
Happened—Several Months Ago on SecondMarket, YAHOO! FIN. (May 21, 2012, 9:44 AM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daniel-gross/facebook-ipo-already-happened-several-months-agosecondmarket-134457488.html (“Thanks to SecondMarket, big-shot investors no longer have to
wait until an IPO to express their enthusiasm about a company. And that means the froth and pop
that used to take place exclusively on the NASDAQ or the NYSE in the opening trading days can
now take place weeks or even months before the official IPO. That’s clearly what happened with
Facebook.”); Derek Thompson, ‘If Facebook’s Profit Model Stays the Same, This Valuation Doesn’t
Make Any Sense’, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2012/05/if-facebooks-profit-model-stays-the-same-this-valuation-doesnt-make-any-sense/
257396/ (“If [you] want something that’s going to have explosive growth, you should have invested
in Facebook a long time ago [on the secondary market].”).
313 Joe Light, Facebook: What’s Next for Secondary Markets, WALL ST. J. TOTAL RETURN
( June 7, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/06/07/facebook-whats-next-forsecondary-markets; see also Tom Foremski, In Facebook IPO Fiasco the ‘Smart Money’ Got Burnt,
ZDNET (May 25, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/foremski/in-facebook-ipo-fiascothe-smart-money-got-burnt/2280 (“The Facebook fiasco . . . should be good news for private stock
markets such as SharesPost and Second Market [sic] because tech IPOs will be cutback leaving
these markets in a great position as the only alternative to being acquired.”).
314 Global Silicon Valley Corp. provides an example of such an indirect investment opportunity. It is a publicly traded, closed-end mutual fund, which has bought private company stock in
private secondary transactions. See Tomio Geron, GSV Capital Investment Values Facebook at $70
Billion, FORBES ( June 27, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2011/06/27/
gsv-capital-investment-values-facebook-at-70-billion (noting that the Global Silicon Valley Corp.
mutual fund included shares of then-private Facebook in its portfolio).
315 For a similar example of competing values, consider the public reaction to the JOBS Act’s
“crowdfunding” exemption, which allows for web-based fundraising in relatively small amounts
from many unaccredited investors. The crowdfunding bill democratized some private company
investing but came under fire from consumer advocates, media commentators, regulators, and
academics for eliminating investor protections and potentially fostering fraud. See, e.g., Luis A.
Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Public Statement, Investor Protection Is Needed for True Capital Formation:
Views on the JOBS Act (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2012/spch031612laa.htm (criticizing the JOBS Act and noting consumer advocates and other
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reminder that as the private secondary markets develop and change, it will
be important to monitor their relationship to public markets. Furthermore,
this discussion underscores that proposals for reform, such as this Article’s
proposal for moderate constraints to respond to information issues, may
need to be revisited as a balance develops in the broader securities regulation context between public and private markets and companies, and
between investor protection, market integrity, capital formation, and other
societal interests.316
CONCLUSION
New online marketplaces for secondary trading of private company
stock may help to increase liquidity at a time when the venture capital
industry and other investors have struggled with the lengthening time it
takes start-up companies to go public or be acquired. The new marketplaces
face significant information issues, however, that threaten their legitimacy
and efficiency. The goal of this Article is to identify and examine these
information issues—lack of information, asymmetric information, conflicts
of interest, and insider trading—as well as provide potential responses that
would allow the markets to continue to evolve, while promoting their
integrity and serving investor protection goals. Looking ahead, the development of these markets should be followed with interest as they help shape
the divide between public and private companies and markets.

organizations that had expressed concerns about removing investor protections); Spurring Job
Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.) (noting
that without his suggested changes or a similar variant, “every barroom in America could become a
securities market, as some unregistered salesman, vaguely resembling Danny DeVito, could set up
shop to market securities under the ‘crowdfunding exemption’”); Robb Mandelbaum, Which
Crowdfunding Bill Will It Be?, N.Y. TIMES YOU’RE THE BOSS (Mar. 27, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://
boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/which-crowdfunding-bill-will-it-be/ (“The most ballyhooed
part of the House JOBS bill . . . is the so-called crowdfunding proposal . . . . Opportunities to
defraud unsuspecting investors . . . may be vast if the House version of the bill survives.”); Felix
Salmon, The Problematic JOBS Act, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/
felix-salmon/2012/03/21/the-problematic-jobs-act/ (“The crowdfunding (a/k/a crowd-muppeting)
part, for instance, seems very badly thought out . . . .”).
316 See Paredes, supra note 178, at 1005 (discussing the delicate balance between regulating for
investor protection, promoting capital formation and investor confidence, and impeding capital
formation with aggressive oversight and enforcement).

